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Abstract
This project consists of two complementary studies exploring structural challenges of the United
Nations through a case study of the Middle East and North African states. The research focuses
on the major organs of the General Assembly, Security Council, Peacebuilding Commission, and
Human Rights Council to analyze and assess their representativeness and legitimacy. The project
is framed as supportive of increased diverse representation in order to provide legitimacy to
organs and policies within the United Nations.
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Executive Summary
The representativeness and structure of the United Nations is an important model for the world.
The United Nations is an important actor in global governance as it responds to international
crises, keeps peace in conflict-stricken locations, and distributes aid all over the world. If the
current United Nations system is unrepresentative, especially in handling dire security issues
around the world, this could hurt the organization’s legitimacy. Furthermore, the structure of the
organization should be reconsidered. This project focuses on two major structural constraints
within the United Nations that affect state members and the representation of interest. First, the
creation of the United Nations is a result of post-World War II politics and does not reflect the
current state of world politics. Second, the United States has a difficult reformation process
which has allowed this outdated model of representation to persist. We can use the Middle East
and North African states as examples of countries that are hindered by these flaws.
This project contains two studies: the first study focuses on understanding how the
Middle East and North African states function as a region within the United Nations system. The
second study uses a set of case studies of MENA and Permanent Five States to see if the
‘MENA identity’ is unique within the UN system. The studies also focus on major organs of the
United Nations: the General Assembly, Security Council, Peacebuilding Commission, and
Human Rights Council in order to analyze and assess their legitimacy in regards to regional
representation.
The first study addresses two main questions: Does the Middle East / North Africa “speak
with one voice,” and is that voice distinct from Africa and Asia? Are Middle East and North
African states currently advocating for a designated Security Council seat? Would a Middle East
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/ North Africa Security Council seat enhance representativeness and degree of democracy based
on the current system of election?
The Middle East / North African states joined the United Nations fairly recently, due to
the decolonization of many MENA states from the middle to end of the 20th century. Because of
this late independence, many UN bodies, such as the Security Council, do not recognize the
Middle East / North Africa as a region. These states are divided into African and Asian regional
groups, and therefore are unable to elect representation specifically for the Middle East and
North Africa region. While there are consistent Security Council seats specifically set aside for
Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America, there are none set aside for the Middle East and North
Africa. These states must represent the continental interests as opposed to their regional interests.
The UN Security Council was created to “maintain international peace and security,” and
is one of the most prominent bodies of the United Nations. I found the lack of a recognized
Middle East and North African ‘voice’ to be a major problem in the Security Council, as many
issues of international peace and security persist in the Middle East / North Africa. My proposed
solution to this problem was for the Security Council to recognize this ‘voice’ and implement a
consistent Middle East and North African seat in order to potentially be more effective and
representative in solving issues in the region.
However, I feel that proposing a Middle East and North African seat is crucial in
researching if the Middle East and North African states have a common regional identity within
the UN system that warrants a separate seat. Perhaps the Middle East and North African states fit
well in their current African and Asian groups. The United Nations General Assembly Debate is
a yearly forum where state representatives discuss the issues they want the United Nations to
prioritize in the upcoming year. To discern if this regional identity exists, I researched the
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General Assembly Debates from 2009-2016 for the Middle East and North African states to see
if these states prioritize similar issues, especially those that are regional topics. I chose this
timeframe to test if the region was unified during the turmoil of the Arab Spring and Syrian
Conflict. Additionally, I also looked at topics related to the current groups, Africa and Asia, to
see if these issues were prioritized more consistently or often than the regional topics.
Along with this, I examined the unrepresentativeness of the current system of Security
Council election, especially for Middle East and North African states. I concluded that while a
Middle East and North African seat would improve the current system of election and may
improve the efficiency of the Security Council, reformation of the current United Nations
structure is unlikely. However, I still advocate for a Middle East and North African seat, because
the current system is unfair to these states.
The second study expands on the questions and issues that were raised in the first study. I
argued in the first study that the regional prioritization of certain topics was unique to the Middle
East and North Africa; however, I expanded this study with other states to compare the
prioritization of these topics. I also focused on Middle East and North African states within the
UN organs of the Peacebuilding Commission and Human Rights Council. In addition, I
conducted specific case studies of individual states to further study the weaknesses of the UN
structure and threats structural flaws present to its legitimacy.
The second study addresses three main questions. Do states outside of the Middle East /
North Africa also prioritize the same regional topics in the General Assembly Debate, and if so,
how strongly, and how does this speak to the uniqueness of the Middle East and North African
identity? Is the current United Nations model of representation unsuitable to the Middle East and
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North African states, or is it beneficial in certain organs? Do norms within the United Nations
system affect states’ actions?
From these studies, I concluded that the current United Nations structure does not allow
for the most representative and legitimate system. Through the examination of the UN structure
regarding the Middle East and North African states, it still seems that the current structure is not
as democratic and as fair as it could be overall.
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1
Introduction

The United Nations was created in the wake of World War II, when a type of world governance
was needed to replace the failed League of Nations. When the United Nations charter and
structure were created, there were fewer states in the United Nations than there are now. Many
states that are now members of the United Nations, specifically in the regions of Middle
East/North Africa, Africa, and Asia, were not independent states when regional groups were
developed, and could not advocate for regional seats in the Security Council. The few states from
Africa that were independent at the time were supportive of the Pan-Africanism movement, so
this combined with a Eurocentric perspective of Africa as a unified region, as opposed to a
complex continent with several sub regions, has allowed this structure to persist. This may be the
same for the Asian region as well, which also has many sub regions.
While the groups in the United Nations are mostly divided by region, a group such as
Western Europe and Other (WEOG) is not defined by region, as it contains states in all different
parts of the world, i.e. the United States, United Kingdom, Israel, Australia, and more (UNITED
NATIONS DGACM 2014). It can be observed that WEOG is an ideological grouping, not a
common culture or geographical location. What this shows is that a Middle East and North
Africa region unified by a combination of cultural and regional aspects is not unfeasible, but is
not a part of the system due to long-persisting norms and outdated structure.
For example, the UN Charter section about the Security Council states that election for
the ten non-permanent seats would be voted on by the General Assembly and would be
designated by “equitable geographical distribution” (UN Charter). Due to the vagueness of this
language, a resolution was created in 1963 to specify how the non-permanent seats would be
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divided. This resolution created the following designations for the composition of the nonpermanent seats: Two representatives from the Western Europe and Other group, one
representative from Eastern Europe, three representatives from Eastern Europe, and seven
representatives from Africa and Asia (General Assembly Resolution 1991). So although this
resolution does acknowledge the expansion of UN membership, it was still enacted before many
states, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, gained independence.
Another aspect is that not only is the structure of the United Nations perhaps outdated,
the reform process is also very difficult. To change the Security Council, it requires an
amendment process, according to Chapter XVIII of the UN Charter. First, a “General Conference
of the Members of the United Nations” must be approved by two-thirds of the members of the
General Assembly and nine Security Council members for reviewing the Charter. The proposed
amendment must be adopted by two-thirds of the General Assembly, and ratified by respective
states’ processes by two-thirds of UN members, which must include all of the P5 members
(Charter of the United Nations 1945). While this is just one case, it can be seen that in order to
make significant changes to the United Nations it requires support of an overwhelming amount
of states to even be considered, much less approved. This is not only a long-persisting structure,
but it is also one that cannot easily be reformed.
All of this matters because the United Nations is a long-lasting structure in an everchanging world with increasingly complex conflicts. I question if aspects of this structure are as
effective as they could be. Currently, parts of the Middle East and North Africa are in complete
turmoil, and yet this region cannot elect an official representative to the Security Council, the
body that “maintains international peace and security” (United Nations Security Council 2016).
There are states that use the structure to remain powerful or project an image on the world stage.
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There are persisting crises around the world, and it is important to examine how effective and
efficient the current systems are. I find in this project that aspects of the United Nations benefit
the Middle East and North Africa in some instances, but in other instances do not, but all of these
show the ineffectiveness of the United Nations.
This project encapsulates two studies, which analyze different aspects of the United
Nations structure. The first study is a general case study of the Middle East and North African
states in the UN system. This study specifically focuses on how the current United Nations
structure, specifically with the Security Council, is unfavorable for the Middle East and North
African states. This study also explores how identity functions within the United Nations, and
how the structure could be improved to promote different identities and be more representative
while solving issues of world security. Both projects mainly focus on the Middle East and North
African states; however, each study focuses on different organs of the United Nations.
The first study focuses on the Middle East and North African states in the General
Assembly and Security Council. The main focuses of the study are the current system of election
of the Middle East and North African states to the Security Council, and if the Middle East and
North African states are unified on issue prioritization through the General Assembly Debates
from 2009 - 2016 in order to have a consistent Middle East and North African seat on the
Security Council. The current system and structure was found to be unfavorable to the region
because the system of election with the rotating Arab Seat was undemocratic.
To improve representativeness in the Security Council, the best solution would be to
create a consistent Middle East and North African seat for the region. During this first study,
there are several questions raised about whether the Middle East and North African states’
“identity” was unique, and needed comparison to other states. Also, while the General Assembly
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and Security Council election have been often studied, I want to further look at other organs of
the United Nations, mainly to see if the structure is unfavorable to these states. With the Security
Council, I want to look beyond the elections and study what meeting topics states focus on
during Security Council service.
The second study was designed to further expand on topics that were addressed in the
first study. While the first study only focused on two main organs, it is necessary to further study
other organs to see if unrepresentativeness is a pattern throughout the UN system. One of the
major flaws of the first study was that the Middle East and North African states’ identity was
labeled as unique, but states outside of the Middle East and North Africa were not studied to
compare this identity. I chose the Permanent (P5) states as comparison, which have a wide array
of international issues in which they are involved. If these states also focused consistently on the
issues of Palestine and Syria, then the unique identity of the Middle East and North African
states based on issue prioritization may not be unique. This was one area in which expansion of
the previous study on the General Debate provided different results than were found before.
I also looked at the Peacebuilding Commission, another important UN organ, as a case
similar to the Security Council, where the membership system is unrepresentative towards the
selected states. In addition I focused on two states, Morocco and Saudi Arabia, to see how the
current UN structure affects individual states’ actions and identities, as opposed to a group of
states. A major theme of the second study was structural norms within the United Nations, and
how these unofficial structural norms may restrict identities of different regions and states, and
also influence representation in different UN organs.
The two studies explore how the UN structure affects the Middle East and North African
states through different UN organs. While the first study finds the structure of the UN to be
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unfavorable to the MENA states, the second study expands on this premise, but also finds
aspects of the UN structure that are favorable to the Middle East and North African states in
representativeness.
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Study 1

Introduction
According to General Assembly resolution XVIII of the UN Charter, the UN system organized
states for Security Council election of nonpermanent seats based on the regions of Western
Europe and Other, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe (United
Nations Security Council 2016). The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is often not
represented in the UN system, which is problematic for Security Council elections. The region
has the plight of being split between the African and Asian state groups in the UN system, which
raises the question of representation and identity for the region, especially for service on the UN
Security Council. The consistent voice of a MENA state should be welcomed, seeing as many
major security issues currently exist in the region.
However, the current system of nomination is that the MENA states are nominated from
the respective, separate groups in which they are categorized. These states are divided between
the Africa and Asia groups, and a routine pattern of election for MENA has developed between
the two groups since the 1990’s. According to a Special Research Report done on Security
Council Elections, of the five consistent seats delegated to Africa and Asia, one of these seats is
a rotating “Arab Seat,” which switches every term between the groups (“Special Research
Report No. 4: Security Council Elections 2011 : Special Research Report : Security Council
Report” 2011). However, this means that MENA states can only run for election every other
term, and the region as a whole does not decide this representation together. Many states in
MENA have vocalized a solution to recognize this distinct identity is to create a consistent
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MENA seat on the Security Council. My main research questions are as follows. Does MENA
speak with one voice and is that voice distinct from Africa and Asia? Are many MENA states
currently advocating for a designated MENA seat? Is a MENA seat necessary based on the
current system for election?
My expectation for this study is that the MENA region has a unified identity within the
UN system, as seen through the high prioritization of regional-interest topics of Palestine, Syria,
and international security, in the General Assembly Debates of 2009-2016. The strength of this
identity will be tested through patterns before, during, and after, the Arab Spring, as well as
before and during the Syrian Conflict. Tunisian president Mohamed Moncef Marzouki depicted
the struggle of the Arab Spring aftermath in his 2013 General Debate speech when he said,
“Nations require decades to gain control of their revolutions and achieve their success or failure”
(Marzouki 2013). The Syrian Conflict was described in 2015 by Sheikh Al-Thani, Amir of
Qatar, as having “catastrophic consequences for the Middle East region and world as a whole,”
while in the same year Iranian President Rouhani also described the conflict as “a wave of
destruction [that] has gone beyond the Arab world” (Al-Thani 2015) and (Rouhani 2015).
It is clear these conflicts impact the whole world, and will continue to do so. The addition
of a consistent MENA seat would benefit the Security Council by routinely having an “insider
voice” on major security issues from the region and enhance legitimacy of the body (Hurd 2008).
Additionally, this representation could help resolutions and actions aimed at solving these
conflicts to be more effective.
As I am advocating for Security Council reform, it was necessary to determine what the
process is to reform the Security Council. There is an amendment process, according to Chapter
XVIII of the UN Charter. First, a “General Conference of the Members of the United Nations”
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must be approved by two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and nine Security
Council members for reviewing the Charter. The proposed amendment must be adopted by twothirds of the General Assembly, and ratified by respective states’ processes by two-thirds of UN
members, which must include all of the P5 members (Charter of the United Nations 1945). Due
to the extensiveness of this process, amendments are rare and difficult to achieve.
I expect to find that MENA states prioritize certain common regional issues, even within
a system that does not recognize the region’s existence. MENA state representatives may
prioritize MENA regional issues more often than the issues of their various caucuses in General
Debate speeches. I also expect to see that the current pattern of election for MENA states is
ineffective and unequal. I expect to find that MENA state representatives often advocate for a
consistent seat of their own.
To define what the “MENA region” encompasses, I draw on United Nations
Environment Programme’s definition, comprising of the following 17 states: Algeria, Bahrain,
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen (“Partnership For Clean Fuels and
Vehicles” 2016). This excludes other commonly grouped states such as Israel, Palestine, Sudan,
and Turkey. Below are justifications for why certain states were included and excluded.

Iran: All of the other states categorized in this region have majority ethnic Arab populations and
are Arabic-speaking, while Iran’s population is mainly Persian and speaks Farsi. Despite this
difference, the Iranian delegation’s website says Iran and its culture are part of the Middle East,
which shows Iranian leaders view the state as part of the region (“General View : Permanent
Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran” 2016) and (“Iranian Press & Media : Permanent
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Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran” 2016). Iran has not been elected to the Security Council
since 1955, and this may be attributed to the Asian group’s lack of rotating efficiently, but more
recently, could be because of the imposition of UN sanctions on Iran (“Special Research Report
No. 2: Security Council Elections 2008 : Special Research Report : Security Council Report”
2008). Potentially now with the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
deal, Iran may be more likely to be elected and confirmed to the Security Council based on good
behavior. Charles Barber (1996) also categorized Iran in the MENA region as well.

Israel: Charles Barber (1996) grouped Israel into the “Middle Eastern States” category in his
Security Council analysis, however Israel is already categorized into the “Western Europe and
Other Groups” in the UN system (UNITED NATIONS DGACM 2014). Even if a permanent
MENA seat was created on the Security Council, Israel may not caucus with this group.
Secondly, even if Israel did join the MENA caucus, the state would not likely be elected, since
the MENA caucus (as I am proposing) would be dominated by Arab states and longtime rival
Iran, many of whom sympathize with the Palestinian cause and condemn Israel’s actions, as is
seen in the General Debate speeches. Lastly, although located physically in the Middle East
region, as stated before, Israel is separate from the rest of the region in many ways, and is
probably most suitable in WEOG.

State of Palestine: Palestine’s UN Observer State status allows it to participate in the General
Debate along with the other member states; however, Palestine is not a UN member state, so it
cannot serve on the Security Council. If a MENA seat were created, Palestine would not be
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eligible for election, and is therefore excluded from this regional grouping for the purpose of this
study.

Sudan: Although some categorize Sudan in North Africa, Sudan recently underwent a revolution
and partition. Before splitting, Sudan may not have been considered part of MENA since it still
included South Sudan, which was culturally and religiously separate from the North. Now, due
to the split, Sudan may consider itself and be considered more a part of the North African states,
as there are cultural similarities, but since this revolution occurred during the examined timeperiod, Sudan’s General Debate transcripts may not reflect this identity before the revolution.
This research is focused on the concept of MENA identity over time, so for the purposes of this
study, Sudan has been excluded.

Turkey: Turkey is also sometimes considered part of the MENA region. Turkey borders the
Middle East and Europe: however it can often be precariously excluded from either group. In the
UN system, Turkey is grouped into the “Western Europe and Other” for purposes of
representation, and additionally consults with the Asia group (UNITED NATIONS DGACM
2014). From its pending European Union admittance, to its involvement with NATO, to its
historical flip-flop between the Middle East and Eastern European Security Council seats, as
identified by Charles Barber, Turkey does not quite fit into one region, and due to this limbo,
Turkey will not be included in this study (1996).

Although this definition of the MENA region may seem like it is a grouping of common
cultural and religious states that is common in the United Nations, the name “Middle East and
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North Africa” indicates a geographical place in the world. I am not proposing this be an “Arab”
or “Islamic” seat, because then that becomes less geographical and more political of a grouping.
Another note is that the “Western Europe and Other Group,” is not really a regionally defined
group, as it spreads from Australia to North America to Western Europe to Turkey to Israel, and
seems to be a group defined by common values. So a MENA caucus grouped regionally and also
culturally would not be commonplace in the UN system.
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Literature Review
The major work that framed this project was Zweifel’s study, “International Organizations and
Democracy,” which has the main premise that international organizations are not, and do not
strive to be democratic. Legitimate proposals for reform of international organizations need to be
specifically targeted, as opposed to general, when addressing undemocratic aspects of these
organizations. His main indicator that the United Nations is not focused on democracy is that the
UN Charter never once says “We the People,” or “democracy,” showing the organization is not
focused on representing the people democratically, but more about representing the interests of
state governments. From studying different international organizations, Zweifel concluded that
bodies like the United Nations need to incorporate stakeholders more and increase democratic
elements, one such way by increasing the permanent and nonpermanent members of the Security
Council. In my project, I use this premise of increased regional representation in UN organs to
increase democratic elements in the organization and establish legitimacy of the organs. Since
UN organs propose policy and programming, it is essential that these organs establish legitimacy
in order to be effective in actuality.
Another source that discusses a precedent of diversity in democracy is Federalist Paper
10 by James Madison. The essay discusses that the formation of factions is unavoidable and also
necessary to preserve democracy. Madison argues that the more parties there are functioning in a
democracy, the less likely it is for one to oppress the others, and similarly, less likely for one
faction’s interests to be represented over another’s. Additionally, expansion of representation to
many different groups also means that more ideas are represented, making the organization more
democratic. These ideas were instrumental in the foundation of American democracy, and based
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on ideas of theorists of the time. While the previous articles were favorable of diverse
representation, the following article is critical of great factionalism.
Scholarly literature on general UN Security Council reform discusses the difficulty of the
UN reform and the domination of P5 states in this process. David Caron is a scholar who is
skeptical of expansion of representation as a means of improving democracy, because he
believes the cost is efficiency. Under the premise that increased representation will decrease
efficiency, Caron questions what the balance and relationship of legitimacy and efficiency is for
the Security Council. For example, how many states would be perceived as “legitimate enough”
on the Security Council, while also maintaining a certain level of “efficiency.” According to
Caron, this is an inverse relationship: increased representation leads to decreased efficiency.
Caron also discusses the domination of the powerful states as a reason for Security Council
reform, but questions if increasing the number of members would counteract this problem. His
solution to this problem is to increase Security Council membership slowly, but still says even
then more power could be transferred to the already powerful states and may not be the solution
to the problem. Caron reflects an opposing view to Security Council reform by way of increasing
membership to be more diverse and representative.
Slaughter discusses Security Council expansion hopes for the G4 states, Brazil, India,
Japan, and Germany, to become permanent members on the Security Council, but due to UN
politics and the influence of the P5, most likely will not (2006). Ian Hurd (2008), who discusses
the view that the Security Council’s legitimacy depends on its diverse representation of the
world. With this view, the more different the members on the Security Council, the more
legitimate the body is. Hurd advocates for more seats to be added to the Security Council to
ensure diversity, because a single state cannot fully represent all of the different ideas of the
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greater region (Hurd, 2008, 200). Both scholars depicted the difficulty of changing the Security
Council election procedure. The authors assume that the current structure of the Security Council
is ineffective and unrepresentative, and Security Council expansion would solve this problem.
However, large states could still dominate the Security Council, and maybe the reform would not
be representative enough. These articles emphasized that reform is important, but unlikely.
Another gap is that neither talked about having a consistent seat on the Security Council for a
region, which is what this project advocates for as a way of increasing representativeness.
There is also a gap in literature written on the topic of a MENA Security Council seat, or
MENA representation in the United Nations. This seems surprising, as the region is commonly
recognized as a separate entity, and contains major international security issues. The only
mention of MENA representation was found in a policy brief for the Center on International
Cooperation, which mentioned the Arab Group’s vocalization for a permanent Arab seat on the
Security Council (Gowan and Gordon 2014, 29). Gowan and Gordon also discussed the role of
the Arab League in the UN system, which speaks out about important MENA issues such as
Syria (Gowan and Gordon 2014, 16). This article was important in finding out that the absence
of a MENA seat has been noted by other scholars, but also in discussing the advocacy role of
international organizations. The article discussed a topic not well covered by scholars and filled a
gap, but the scholar discussed many different topics on the surface-level, as opposed to focusing
on one in depth. There was little discussion of the factors and details surrounding each of the
topics in the brief.
In summary, general discussions on Security Council reform were found more frequently
than discussion of adding a consistent MENA seat to the Security Council. It seems few scholars
are discussing or advocating for consistent MENA membership on the Security Council.
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However, the question is if MENA states representatives themselves call for a seat, which will be
looked at through analysis of General Debate transcripts. This is helpful in seeing the challenges
to reform, as well as the prominent voices advocating for Security Council reform. My research
will expand on what a MENA seat would look like: who represents MENA now, what issues are
important to the region, and why a consistent MENA seat is essential, which has not been
covered by previous scholars.
As the issues of the Palestinian and Syria conflicts will be discussed within the General
Debate in this project, it is important to look at what has previously been written on the topic.
Both scholarly articles focused on the Palestinian Conflict detailed the history of UN actions and
discourse surrounding the conflict. The pattern was that the more powerful states are involved in
the Conflict, but this has not led to any results. There was also a pattern of limitation for what the
United Nations can do to solve the Conflict. The articles detailed exact UN actions and
resolutions that happened to emphasize the point, but did not discuss if MENA states influenced
or affected actions, only how the P5 were involved.
All of this is important because the unsolved nature of this Conflict partly explains why
there is a pattern of this topic being brought up by MENA states in the General Assembly. With
articles discussing the UN and the Syria Conflict, a similar pattern of UN action, followed by
little results, or UN inaction, was found. These articles did bring up a different analysis of the
situation from the Palestinian Conflict. The authors mentioned that if the United Nations
continues to be ineffective in upholding international law with the Syrian Conflict, it would
seriously undermine the legitimacy of the United Nations (Rostow, Koh, Mathias, Mohamed,
and Arsanjani 2012). These analyses by other scholars lend some legitimacy to my claim that the
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reasons these conflicts are brought up most frequently is due to the current system’s
ineffectiveness in solving these regional issues.

17
Methodology
This qualitative case study analyzes archival data (Berg and Lune 2017, 165). The archival data
are drawn from primary sources from the UN website, including the UN General Debate
Speeches Archives, UN Security Council member records, and the UN Peacekeeping website.
To learn about the current system of election to the Security Council for MENA states,
and to follow the pattern of the rotating MENA seat, I updated Charles Barber’s work, “UNSC
Representation: The First 50 Years and Beyond” (1996). I used the UN Security Council website
to record the amount of times MENA states served on the Security Council, when the states
gained independence and UN membership, and if there were any patterns in service since the
inception of the United Nations in 1945. If the states had not served on the Security Council for a
long time, I calculated how long it had been since they served to see if there was a present
pattern. Collecting these qualitative data were essential to seeing the representation patterns of
election to Security Council.
To complement the data updating Barber’s work, I examined peacekeeping troop and
police contributions by each selected state, to see if there is a correlation between the number of
terms served on Security Council and the number of peacekeeping troop contributions. This is
because peacekeeping contributions are often an indicator of states “maintaining international
peace and security,” and by demonstrating this commitment, it may help states get elected to the
Security Council (UN Security Council 2016). Since I was comparing data over time, I looked at
data starting from 2000, to 2016, because before 2000 the data were measured differently, and I
wanted to keep the data measurements consistent for comparison. The contribution timeframe
every year was from January-August, because the 2016 data only goes until August, and again, I
wanted to keep my measurements consistent. I then took the average of all of the contributions of
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one state over the time period to compare the figures. For the second graph of the peacekeeping
data, the data were expanded to include the years 1990-2000, because this is the earliest data
shown for peacekeeping on the website. As the goal of these data are to show a comparison over
time with each state, not to each other, the measurement methods being different does not skew
the data like the above.
To determine if MENA states represent similar interests in the UN system, I conducted
content analysis on the General Debate transcripts of MENA states from 2009-2016. This
timeframe was chosen because the MENA region has faced tumultuous and divisive unrest with
the Arab Spring and the Syrian Conflict. It was necessary to look before, during, and after these
events to see if the MENA region generally has remained unified on security and peace priorities
throughout this period of unrest. This longstanding pattern could speak to the unity and identity
of the region as a whole, and if a seat would work for the region.
Each MENA state’s General Debate speeches were searched for key phrases and patterns
of issues. These issues were looked at across the states and the timeframe. I counted the number
of MENA state representatives who brought up certain topics each year, looked at the number of
times certain issues were brought up for each state’s speech, and calculated percentages based on
these findings.
As defined by the UN website, the General Debate is “…the annual meeting of Heads of
State and Government at the beginning of the General Assembly session…the only one in which
Heads of State and Government regularly participate” (Frequently Asked Questions about the
United Nations Security Council 2016). The General Debate serves as a platform for states to
discuss their priorities to the world. If a speaker in the General Debate used one of the terms in
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the codebook below, this counted as a “mention.” State representatives have limited time and if
they spend time to discuss a topic, even briefly, this shows a commitment to this issue.
The main topics of analyses of “international security,” “Palestine,” and “Syria” were
chosen because these are current topics that would most likely be brought up on the Security
Council that pertain to the MENA region. International security is a more broad term, designed
to show state’s general commitment to ideas of security and counter-terrorism. This topic was
chosen before I started the research process. I chose the conflicts of Palestine and Syria because
these are two of the largest security issues in the MENA region that currently render discussion
in the Security Council. I also selected Security Council reform to determine if MENA states
advocate for reform and demand a continuous seat on the Security Council.
To see if the MENA states potentially identify with their respective caucuses, I decided to
also track general and unspecific African and Asian topics in addition to the two MENA topics.
This paper assumes specific topics in the MENA region are more important for region members
than to other regions. I found the General Debate data show no pattern of specific African or
Asian issues the MENA states discussed over time, whereas there was a pattern of the MENA
topics of Palestine and Syria being consistently brought up by a majority of states every year. If
MENA states brought up topics related to their caucuses more consistently than MENA issues,
this could show a MENA Security Council seat would not be necessary because the states
identify with the African and Asian regions. This comparison could also further show that a
MENA seat is necessary if MENA topics are more of a focus to these states.
Shown below Table 1 with coded indicator topics related to the UN Security Council and
MENA region, with explanation of the methodology for content analysis.
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Table 1: Coding for UN General Debate Phrases
Topic

Phrases

Palestine

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Question of Palestine
State of Palestine
Israeli aggression/ violation
Arab-Israeli Conflict
Arab Peace Process
Palestinian brothers
Two-state solution

Syria

•
•
•
•
•

Syrian Conflict
Syrian regime
Syrian people
Syrian brothers
Syrian refugees

International
Security

•
•
•
•
•
•

Terrorism
Counterterrorism
Nonproliferation
Chemical and Nuclear weapons
Terrorist organizations
International Security

UN Reform

•
•
•
•
•

Security Council Reform
Africa seat
MENA seat
Arab seat
General UN reform

Africa

•

An issue in an African state outside of described MENA region (all
states on the African continent below the Sahara)
Africa as a whole
African identity
African Union

•
•
•
Asia 1

•
•

1

An issue in an Asian country outside of described MENA region (East
Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia)
Asia as a whole

Comment: Originally only Security Council reform was going to be looked at as a topic, however, there
was equal if not more calls for general UN reform by MENA region states. I made the determination that
these generally give the same idea and would be appropriate to consolidate.
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I marked that a topic had been mentioned after the first occurrence of it in the General
Debate transcripts for each state. For the specific MENA issues of Palestine and Syria, I
calculated the number of times mentioned within each speech to see if there was a pattern of how
often individual states brought up these issues, and if this contributes to the idea of “MENA
identity.” I thought by calculating these specific issues, it could expand my argument that this
identity is present. These issues affect the whole region, and a region-wide prioritization of these
issues on the world stage may indicate a regional identity encompassing similar beliefs, political
goals, and culture. For this calculation, I counted every time a state representative mentioned one
of the key phrases in Table 1. For the other issues, the number of times mentioned in the
individual transcripts was not calculated; because the mere fact the issues were brought up in this
forum shows their significance.
The topics above had to be explicitly stated in order to count for this study, however,
there was one instance where King Abdullah of Jordan alluded to the topic of Palestine. In his
2015 speech, he said that Jordan “join[s] Muslims and Christians everywhere in rejecting threats
to the holy places and the Arab character of that Holy City” (Abdullah 2015). This phrase does
not specifically state support for Palestine with this vague wording. I included the topic as a
“mention” because Jordan would not allude to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the General Debate if
they did not find it important. This interpretation is subjective, and others could interpret this
differently.
Attitudes towards these topics were not analyzed as “positive,” “negative,” and “neutral,”
for a few reasons. Due to the history and cultural identity of the MENA region, their attitudes
towards the issue of Palestine are generally the same. The Palestinians share this cultural identity
with Arab and Islamic states, and therefore these states are sympathetic to the Palestinian side of
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the conflict, and this can be seen through the language used in the previous coding table. The
General Debate speeches indicated all of the MENA states selected did have this view. The
Syrian Conflict has more varied attitudes, but the importance of the issue is similar even if the
points of view are not exactly the same. For the other issues, it did not seem conducive to this
analysis to describe an issue such as international security or UN reform as “positive” or
“negative.” For this project, further categorization of the selected topics was deemed
unnecessary.
In general, the reader should allow for a slight margin of error, as human error in
calculating and counting easily occurs. The methodology and process for collecting the data has
been depicted in careful detail. If the study is to be replicated, start by using the UN Security
Council website to see the list of which states have served on the Security Council, and when
they served. The list of UN membership dates can also be found on the UN website under
“About the UN,” and then “Member States.” The UN “Member States” section included most of
the dates of independence.
For the General Debate speech process, I accessed the UN General Debate transcripts
through the UN archives. I looked at English transcripts of Sessions 64-71 for the 16 states (17 in
2012 and 2015 when a Saudi Arabian representative participated) in the MENA region. I visited
each state’s General Debate speeches page in the selected years and read the transcripts for
mention of these topics, noted if a topic was mentioned in a table, and counted the times the key
phrases for Palestine and Syria were mentioned. After all of the data were collected, I calculated
the percent of states that brought up a certain topic each year by dividing the states that
mentioned the topic over the total number of states who participated that year. I looked for
patterns during this timeframe.
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For the peacekeeping data, I used the UN website to find the troop and police
contributions each year, and then averaged all of the contributions for each MENA state during
the 2000-2016 timeframe. I reported how many were contributed for every selected state, and
compared side-by-side with the number of Security Council terms to look for a correlation.
I collected data from secondary sources such as the UN Press and UN News Services
websites, and scholarly articles about UN reform. Quotations from press statements were
necessary to show that the MENA topics of Palestine and Syria were deemed important by
others, and to the United Nations as well. These data show security issues that were important to
MENA were also important to the United Nations, and MENA may provide insight and problem
solving to these issues with a reserved seat on the Security Council. If these issues were not
deemed important by UN representatives and administration, it would not matter as much if
MENA prioritized them because it may not be as necessary for them to have a separate
permanent seat. The literature on the Security Council reform was enlightening as to a) how hard
reforming the United Nations, especially the Security Council, is, and b) that MENA has been
neglected in reform discussion. Though maybe important to the region, other states are more
widely recognized as needing UNSC reform. This evaluated the feasibility of a MENA seat
being created, and it was found there is lack of discourse on the issue among scholars and
MENA states alike.
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Security Council Representation
I updated Charles Barber’s “ UNSC Representation: The First 50 Years and Beyond,” focusing
only on the previously-defined 17 MENA states to introduce the current dynamics of election to
the Security Council as a member of the MENA region, and the need for a permanent MENA
seat. Charles Barber used quantitative analysis to explain patterns in Security Council service by
regional caucuses, as well as the broader political context to explain these trends. In 2015,
Algeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lamamra, said in his General Debate speech that
Security Council reform is necessary as the Security Council “no longer mirrors the composition
of the international community, particularly the African continent,” which brings up
dissatisfaction with the current system for the African group (Lamamra, 2015). More
specifically, Kuwaiti Prime Minister Sheikh Al Sabah said in the 2012 General Debate that
Security Council membership should be added to “….reflect the new international reality and to
ensure that Arab and Islamic States are represented fairly,” and once again brought up the need
for a region-specific seat because “issues relating to the Arab States and their region top the
agenda of the Council…” (Al Sabah, 2012) and (Al Sabah, 2015).
Barber (1996) defined the Middle East region as 23 states, however; only 17 states will
be categorized in the MENA region in this study. Barber included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
and Turkey, in this region; however, the UN system Economic Commission for Europe
categorized theses states in Europe, so are not included in this study (“Member States and
Member States Representatives” 2016). Barber also included Israel in the Middle East, however;
the UN designates Israel in the Western Europe and Other group and is not included in this
study. The inclusion of these four states plus the 17 previously mentioned brings Barber’s total to
22. I could not determine the last state, potentially two states (if he did not count Turkey in his
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Middle East state total) Barber included in the Middle East, however, these states were never
specifically discussed throughout the article and could not be accurately predicted.
Barber’s study was conducted to 1996, and focused on regional groups, whereas I
expanded to 2017 with the specified MENA states. I found a consistent pattern of a MENA seat
alternating between the African and Asian groups. Table 2 shows the number of times each of
the 17 states served on the Security Council, when these terms were, the date of independence
for the state, and the date of UN membership.

Table 2: MENA States Served on Security Council, 1946 to 2017
MENA
States

Number
of Terms
on
Security
Council

Terms

Date of
Independence

Date of UN
Membership

UN
Caucus

Egypt

5

1946, 19491950, 19841985,
1996-1997,
2016-2017

23/07/1952

24/10/1945

Africa

Syria

3

1947-1948,
1970-1971,
2002-2003

17/04/1946

24/10/1945

Asia

Lebanon

2

1953-1954,
2010-2011

22/11/1943

24/10/1945

Asia

Iran

1

1955-1956

01/04/1979

24/10/1945

Asia

Iraq

2

1957-1958,
1974-1975

14/07/1958

21/12/1945

Asia

Tunisia

3

1959-1960,
1980-1981,
2000-2001

20/03/1956

12/11/1956

Africa

26

Morocco

3

19631964,19921993, 20122013

18/11/1955

12/11/1956

Africa

Jordan

3

1965-1966,
1982-1983,
2014-2015

25/05/1946

14/12/1955

Asia

Algeria

3

1968-1969,
19881989, 20042005

01/11/1954

08/10/1962

Africa

Libya

2

1976-1977,
2008-2009

24/12/1951

14/12/1955

Africa

Kuwait

1

1978-1979

25/02/1950

14/05/1963

Asia

UAE

1

1986-1987

02/12/1971

09/12/1971

Asia

Yemen

1

1990-1991

22/05/1990

30/09/1947

Asia

Oman

1

1994-1995

18/11/1940

07/10/1971

Asia

Bahrain

1

1998-1999

16/12/1971

21/09/1971

Asia

Qatar

1

2006-2007

03/09/1971

21/09/1971

Asia

Saudi
Arabia 2

0

Elected, but
rejected seat

23/09/1932

24/10/1945

Asia

Sources: “List of Countries Which Have Been Elected Members of the United Nations Security
Council since 1946” and “List of National Independence Days.”

It is important to discuss the necessity of the date of independence and UN membership.
In this region, all states were colonies, and most did not become UN member states until
2

Saudi Arabia was elected to the Security Council in 2014, however, ended up denying the seat.
Expanded on in Study II.
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independence, which affects the number of times these states have served on the Security
Council. There are a few key patterns that can be seen from this table. One of which is that the
North African states, minus Egypt, received independence later than several Middle Eastern
states, and waited an equal, if not shorter amount of time to serve on the Security Council from
the year they were granted UN membership. The pattern of the alternating MENA Security
Council seat between the African and Asian states is evident from the table.
This rotation, however, does not lead to equality in representation, due to the difference
in sizes between the split MENA groups. There are only five North African states who serve on
the rotating seat when it comes to the African caucus, as opposed to 12 Middle Eastern states in
the Asian caucus, which means Middle East states have a voice on the Security Council less than
the North African states. From the data collected, it is inferred the rotating pattern between
African and Middle Eastern states will continue, which means the North African states will serve
almost twice as many times as the Middle Eastern states. This uneven division does not allow for
equal voices from MENA to be heard. The argument could be made that MENA is actually
better off being divided, because the pool is smaller for competition when each group gets the
MENA seat.
However, each group must wait until they get the MENA seat in order to run, whereas
with a consistent MENA seat, interested MENA states could run whenever they wanted. With
ever changing issues in the Middle East, like Palestine and the Syrian conflict, the timing of
serving on the Security Council could align with major decisions being made about the issue.
With a MENA seat, all of the states would have a fairer chance of being nominated within a
group of similar states, as opposed to being grouped with a larger continent.
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Barber noted that Africa has one of the best records for representation, whereas the Asian
group is highly dominated by leaders of the region (Barber 1996). Recently, this has allowed the
North African states to each serve on the Security Council about every 20 years; as there is five
states that equally rotate every four terms. For example, Egypt served in 1996-1997, and again in
2016-2017, because this seat rotated through each North African state until it was Egypt’s turn
again. However, on the Middle East side, there is a pattern of states serving on the Security
Council less, but many also did not join the United Nations until 1971 (UAE, Oman, Bahrain,
Qatar), which is later than the North African states who joined in the 1940s, 1950s, and early
1960s. It is possible, however, that these previously mentioned states did not want to serve on the
Security Council, which will be discussed in the next section.
There are also gaps in MENA states serving on the Security Council before 1996, which
indicate this is not always a true and reserved MENA rotating seat. From 1951-1952, Turkey
served on the Security Council and from 1972-1973, Sudan served on the Security Council,
when none of the defined MENA states did at this time (List of Countries Which Have Been
Elected… 2016). So although it cannot be proven they replaced the rotating seat, it could be
assumed by looking at the other states that also served at the same time. I have already discussed
why these states are problematic in representing MENA, so during these years, MENA’s
interests may not have been represented much. Although this gap hasn’t occurred for several
decades, it still shows that the seat could easily be delegated to another state because it is
“unofficial.”
The Security Council has four main goals: “to maintain international peace and security,
to develop friendly relations among nations, to cooperate in solving international problems and
in promoting respect for human rights, and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations,”
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and the peacekeeping program is the most aligned with achieving these goals (United Nations
Security Council 2016). The clearest way for states to demonstrate this commitment to Security
Council service and international peace and security is by providing peacekeeping troops to
missions. I looked at peacekeeping troop contributions by state for the following reasons: one, to
see if there is a correlation in the number of terms served on the Security Council and the number
of peacekeeping troops supplied, and two, if when a state served on the Security Council or was
about to, the state changed peacekeeping contribution numbers. The number of peacekeeping
troops contributed or lack there of could indicate a state’s desire to be on the Security Council.
Table 3: MENA States’ Average Number of Peacekeeping Troops and Police
Contributions, 2000-2016
Average
Peacekeeping Troops
Number of Terms
and Police
Served on Security
MENA State
Contributed
Council
Jordan
2801
3
Egypt
1893
5
Morocco
1396
3
Tunisia
254
3
Yemen
192
1
UAE
93
1
Qatar
24
1
Algeria
12
3
Libya
4
2
Iran
3
1
Lebanon
1
2
Bahrain
0
1
Iraq
0
2
Kuwait
0
1
Oman
0
1
Syria
0
3
3
Saudi Arabia
0
0*
Source: “Troop and Police Contributors. United Nations Peacekeeping.”
3

Saudi Arabia was elected to the Security Council in 2014, however, ended up denying the seat.
Expanded on in Study II.
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From the table above, there appears to be some correlation in that the top four
contributors to peacekeeping operations in the MENA region (Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and
Tunisia) are also among those who have served the most terms on the Security Council for the
region. This may show a connection of demonstrating commitment to international peace and
wanting to be elected to the Security Council, to actually being elected to the Security Council.
There are two important outliers to this pattern: Algeria and Syria, both of whom have served as
many times as Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, but with an average contribution of 12 and 0 troops
and police, respectively. Algeria serving three times on the Security Council goes back to the
unfairness of the rotating MENA seat. The cyclical pattern that has been established means that
Algeria will be elected regardless, without needing to contribute a significant amount of
peacekeepers. The North African states seem to nominate each other for Security Council based
on fairness, not based on peacekeeping contributions.
Since increased peacekeeping contributions can show a commitment and desire to be on
the Security Council, it is possible based on the lack of contribution from the Middle East states
there is a lack of desire to be on the Security Council. A major flaw in Barber’s work is that he
assumes every state wants to serve on the Security Council, which may not be true. Based on his
findings, he assumes that since the Asian caucus is dominated by a few powerful states, many
states are not elected to the Security Council. In reality, states may not bid for Security Council
service because they do not wish to serve on the Security Council, not because they go unelected
by fellow states. The states who provided 0 peacekeepers during the examined time period,
Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Syria, and Saudi Arabia are all in the Asian caucus, and have also
served on the Security Council a low number of terms. The one exception is Syria, who has
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served three times, equal to big-time contributors Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. It makes sense
that Syria has served a high amount of times without necessarily having a high amount of
peacekeepers because Syria was the second state in the MENA region to become a member of
the United Nations in 1945, so Syria has had a long amount of time to serve. If Security Council
election can be based on the “merit” of providing a lot of peacekeeping troops, it seems unfair
that based on the rotation, these numbers may not matter at all.
Although it cannot be directly proven that states that serve on the Security Council more
often also contribute the most peacekeepers, it seems to be a pattern that commitment to
peacekeeping can also mean commitment to Security Council service. To avoid the same
assumption Barber made, I looked at states around the time of Security Council to see if these
states altered their peacekeeping contributions in order to demonstrate “maintaining international
peace and security” (United Nations Security Council 2016).
Figure 1: Peacekeeping Contributions for Selected MENA States, One Year before Security
Council Term to Second Year of Security Council Term, 1991-2017 4

Source: “Troop and Police Contributors Archive (2000 - 2010). United Nations
Peacekeeping.”
4

Egypt only has two data points because those are figures from its current term on
Council, and the second year has not happened yet.

the Security
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From the period of 1990-2016, an increase in peacekeeping troops in the years before and
during the term on the Security Council could be seen with five different states. The states of
Morocco and Egypt heavily increased numbers in the year leading up to Security Council
service, which was most likely when elections were happening, whereas Tunisia and Qatar
highly increased numbers during time on the Security Council. As discussed before, due to the
noncompetitive North African pattern for the Security Council seat, it does not seem necessary
that states increase peacekeeping troops to demonstrate qualification to serve, however it is
possible Egypt and Morocco did so to promote an image of commitment to peace and security,
or perhaps there were peacekeeping missions that fit their interests.
The UN Security Council and peacekeeping data showed the unfairness of the current
system of election for the MENA states. This questions, however, if the MENA states are unified
in interests and thoughts in the UN system to have a consistent MENA representative on the
Security Council.
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General Debate
In this section, I will discuss the results from the General Debates. While I am expecting MENA
states to be unified on regional issues, it is necessary to see if the states align on issues focused
on the Security Council’s mission. As discussed before, the UN Security Council focuses on “the
maintenance of international peace and security,” as well as settling disputes around the world
peacefully (“United Nations Security Council” 2016). Members on the Security Council are
expected to participate in discourse and decision-making to promote this mission, as well as
determine topics of discussion. States from different regions often serve as the voice of their
region and bring up the issues and viewpoints of this region. I tracked certain issues, which can
be found in the following sections.

Palestine
The topic of Palestine was brought up by the most states of all of the topics tracked. Every year,
Palestine was brought up by 80% or more of the MENA states, as can be seen in Table 4.
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Table 5: MENA States’ Discussion of Palestinian Conflict in General Debate, 2009-2015
Year

Number of States Mentioned
Support for Palestine

Total MENA
States

Percent of States Mentioned
Palestine

2009

14

16

88%

2010

16

16

100%

2011

13

16

81%

2012

17

17 5

100%

2013

14

16

88%

2014

15

16

94%

2015

15

17

88%

2016

15

17

88%

Source: Past General Assembly Debates, 2009 – 2016.

These findings show that MENA is unified on the priority of the Palestinian issue. The
nature of these mentions, as discussed in the “Coding” in the Methodology section, are in
support of a solution to the Palestinian situation, or are critical of Israeli actions toward Palestine,
which shows MENA is mostly unified in ideology towards the issue as well. Most of the MENA
states view the Palestinian Conflict from a social justice perspective—these states want
recognition and statehood for their fellow region member. Since the Palestinian conflict is an
issue of peace and security, which is what the Security Council focuses on, I can infer that, any
MENA state serving on the Security Council would represent the region’s interests and priority
on the Palestinian issue.

5

Number of MENA states was 17 when Saudi Arabia participated in the General Debates. Expanded on
in Study II.
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Throughout the six years, every MENA state supported the Palestinian cause in the
General Debate, but sometimes there were fluctuations when a few states did not bring the topic
up in certain years. For instance, it is unclear why in General Debate speeches from 2013-2015,
the representative of Morocco did not bring up the Palestinian Conflict once, especially since it
was mentioned in all of the prior years. Despite this one fluctuation, the Palestinian conflict is
overwhelmingly a unifying, regional issue. MENA representation on the Security Council is
essential for the Palestinian Conflict because of regional interest, and is a conflict that Secretary
Ban Ki-moon described as having “long-pending issues,” which will most likely continue to be
discussed on the Security Council as it is unresolved (United Nations News Service 2016).

Syrian Conflict
The Syrian Conflict was brought up by the second-most among MENA states from 2012 (when
the conflict escalated) to 2016. Secretary Ban Ki-Moon unofficially described the Syrian
Conflict as “a clear threat to international peace and security,” at a Security Council meeting
(United Nations Press 2015). The table below shows the number of MENA states that discussed
the Syrian Conflict in General Debate speeches.
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Table 6: MENA States’ Discussion of Syrian Conflict in General Debate, 2012-2016
Year

Number of States Mentioned
Syrian Conflict

Total MENA
States

Percent of States Mentioned
Syrian Conflict

2012

15

17 6

88%

2013

15

16

94%

2014

13

16

81%

2015

13

17

76%

2016

14

17

82%

Source: Past General Assembly Debates, 2009 – 2016.

The findings show that every year since the Syrian Conflict began, 75% or more of
MENA states have discussed the Syrian Conflict in the General Debate. While many of the states
studied condemn the conflict in Syria and are unsupportive of the regime, it cannot be ignored
that the transcripts of Syria and Iran were read for this project. The Syrian and Iranian
representatives had a pro-Syrian regime perspective of the conflict, however despite this
difference, I am arguing that these states still prioritize the Conflict and recognize its importance.
Since the conflict has major security implications for the world, this issue will likely be
discussed in the Security Council. As with the Palestinian Conflict, most MENA states each year
mentioned the importance of solving the Conflict for the region, so this issue also shows that the
studied MENA states have unified security priorities.

6

Number of states was 17 when a representative of Saudi Arabia participated in the General Debates.
Expanded on in Study II.
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International Security
Another issue clearly related to the Security Council is international security, which consists of
general topics related to terrorism, nuclear/chemical weapons, and non-proliferation. MENA
states discussed this topic the most after the topics of Palestine and Syria. Each year between
2009-2016, at least 50% or more, sometimes up to 100%, of MENA states brought up issues of
international security. By discussing these topics, the selected MENA states showed a
commitment to serve on the Security Council.

UN Reform
While these results were not found to be as significant as the previous findings, on average, 30%
or more of MENA states mentioned a need for general UN or Security Council reform each year,
with the highest being 44% of MENA states in 2010 (Past General Assembly Debates, 2009 2015). Even though there were not an overwhelming number of MENA states brought up reform
in the selected timeframe, the idea is still present. I expected there to be a stronger pattern of the
chosen states mentioning UN reform than was found. However, this also does not necessarily
represent which states do/do not support UN reform or a MENA seat because there may be states
that would support a MENA seat if it became likely. As discussed before, it seems that Brazil,
India, Germany, or Japan seat is discussed before a MENA seat, and the reform process is
difficult, so perhaps some states wanted to focus on other important issues in the General Debate
instead of Security Council reform that may be unfeasible.
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African / Asian Topics
The last topics I analyzed in the General Debate transcripts is the number of states that
mentioned issues about Africa and Asia to see if the MENA states mentioned these more than the
MENA issues. For these data, the MENA states were split to see if issues from Africa and Asia
were prioritized. For most years, 80% or more of the five-member MENA North African group
(Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia) mentioned African topics outside of the MENA
region defined earlier. It was quite surprising to find how consistently the North African group
brought up these other issues, almost as equally in number as the MENA issues.
For the Asian group, there were different findings. The Asian group is defined as the 12
states of Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Syria, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia,
and Yemen. However, the Middle East group in Asia inconsistently brought up topics about the
other states of Asia, ranging from 50% of MENA states in 2012 to 8% of states in 2015. It
should be noted that in 2012, there was a disastrous flood in Pakistan, which is the Asian topic
that was brought up by many states that year, but this was an uncommon occurrence. It seems the
African states may feel a stronger affinity to Africa than the Asian group states feel to Asia;
however, this does not truly prove that either is attached to the larger groups. It may just be an
indicator that during the General Debate, the MENA states are more likely to bring up MENA
topics as opposed to African/Asian topics. Even though this may show the North African group
prioritize African issues almost equally to MENA issues, it does not necessarily mean these
states would not support the addition of a MENA reserved seat in the UN Security Council.
The results from the General Debate suggest that there is a regional identity for the
MENA states studied within the UN system that persists over time because most states
prioritized the same MENA security issues. During this time, MENA underwent the Arab
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Spring, continuing Palestinian Conflict, ISIL, and the Syrian Conflict. Despite this, throughout
this time period, there were regional patterns of identity. The findings from the UN General
Debates from 2009-2016 show that the MENA states consistently focus on issues relevant to the
MENA region, and inconsistently focus on the issues of their respective regional caucuses. The
research also shows that UN reform is not brought up consistently and overwhelmingly, but
usually brought up by a third of states each year. If given a reserved Security Council seat, the
MENA states would most likely have a unified voice about issues and interests the states would
represent, but the region is not vocally advocating for this seat, as seen in the General Debate.
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Conclusions of Study 1
The United Nations and the Security Council should recognize the MENA identity, especially
since many current international security issues originate in the MENA region, and this voice
should be viewed as essential. The results have shown the inefficiency and unfairness of election
to the Security Council for the MENA states, while simultaneously proving the general
unification of the MENA states enough to be recognized as a separate region, perhaps more than
their currently categorized groups. While the reform of the United Nations is complex and
difficult to achieve, I argue that a consistent MENA seat on the Security Council is imperative to
international security and peace.
A way to expand this research could be to look at the sequence order, but I think
mentioning an issue is an indicator enough of its importance to the state representative speaking.
An area for further study would be to look at General Debate transcripts further back in time, to
see if this identity has been as cohesive as it was during this timeframe. Another source to use in
addition to UN General Debate transcripts would be the different MENA states’ UN delegation
websites, to see which issues are discussed there as well. If looking at other regional identity
issues, it could be interesting to look at the split between Latin America and the Caribbean, and
the different regions of Africa and Asia to see if they align on issue priorities as well. It is
possible that large geographical groupings of states may not be the most effective way for
interests to be represented on the Security Council. This study found this structure to be
unfavorable to MENA states, and it is possible aspects of the UN could be restructured to benefit
other groups as well.
With a recognized MENA seat on the Security Council, representation could be improved
and more diversified, and there could be more democratic elections to the Security Council than
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the current system. The current Security Council does not promote diverse representation to
reflect the world now. MENA is a commonly accepted region now, and the persisting colonial
structure of the organ prevents these states from being able to elect each other in the most
democratic way possible. This goes back to the idea of if the United Nations was made to be
democratic, or as effective as possible at the cost of representativeness.
While some scholars worry that if the Security Council is enlarged, the effectiveness of
the organ will be compromised, however, the Security Council is already ineffective towards the
conflicts in the MENA region, which can be seen by their unresolved status. I do not see how
adding more seats on the Security Council could make the organ less effective towards these
conflicts than they already are. In addition, perhaps increasing representation would not only
bolster legitimacy of Security Council resolutions, but also make the organ more effective by
having a wider spread of ideas from different regions. Maybe certain long-persisting problems in
the Middle East are unsolved due to the MENA region being grouped into broader geographical
areas, and therefore having to represent a plethora of interests. Certain aspects of the organs of
the Security Council and General Assembly were found to be unrepresentative and in long need
of reform for the selected MENA states, and it can only be imagined what could be
accomplished and solved in the United Nations with more democratic and legitimate practices.
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Study II
Introduction
In the first study of this project, I focused solely on the MENA states and different aspects of
their identity within the United Nations system. While there were overall patterns found in the
General Debate speeches, rotation of the Security Council seat, and in peacekeeping
contributions, there are other parts of the UN system that can be furthered studied. MENA’s
identity appears to be unique, but this cannot be determined by only looking at MENA states.
This study expands to the Permanent Five states on the Security Council, United States (U.S.),
United Kingdom (U.K.), Russia, France, and China, to compare with MENA’s identity. To
determine if MENA’s identity is unique, General Debate speeches for the P5 were analyzed
using the same methodology as Study 1. In addition, the Peacebuilding Commission was also
analyzed to further highlight the dominance of the powerful states, and the unrepresentativeness
of the UN structure, especially towards MENA.
This research uses specific MENA state case studies to highlight functioning structural
norms within the United Nations, which may not allow for unique identities. While the idea of
states’ images is an underlying theme in the first study, I will discuss how this theme relates to
state actions in this study. In the previous section, I found general patterns and themes of the
MENA states in the United Nations, however, more specific and empirical case studies were
necessary for this project. The case studies of the Morocco, and Saudi Arabia demonstrate the
structural limitations that states face within the UN system. The case study on Morocco focuses
on Security Council meeting topics as well as Morocco’s counterterrorism involvement, while
the case study on Saudi Arabia focuses on its denial of the Security Council seat and

43
involvement on the Human Rights Council. In this part, I seek to address topics that will expand
on and potentially question the results from the first study.
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Norms in the United Nations
In this study I will explore the concept of norms within the UN system. There are two previous
case studies focused on UN norms: weapons treaties and human rights. They both focus on the
idea of norms being embedded in the UN system by way of these different topics. Teal Buckner
Lowring cites in his case study that norms can be identified “‘by looking at the consistent
behavior of states’” (Hurrell 2007). David B. Steele also discussed a similar definition of norms,
in that they come into being by “usage and general acceptance” (Steele, 2007). While a lot of
literature focuses on the United Nations setting international norms outside of the organization,
there is not much, if any, literature on norms inside of the United Nations, which is one of the
ideas in which I focus for this study. These concepts were necessary to provide background of
the United Nations as a norm-setting institution. For the purpose of this study, the term
“structural norms” and “norms” will refer to the idea that norms are often deeply embedded in
the UN system and function as part of the structure of the United Nations.
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Methodology
In this part, the General Debate speech topics for the P5 states were studied using the same
methodology as for the MENA states. The topics of Palestine, Syria, international security, and
UN reform were examined to identify a pattern. As in Study 1, I chose the timeframe from 2009
to 2016. The specifics of this process can be found in the methodology section of Study 1.
For the case study focused on Morocco, I completed content analysis of the most recent
time each North African state, as defined by Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria,
served on the Security Council. The role of the Security Council President is to dictate the
agenda for one month per term (Daily Programme of Work of the United Nations Security
Council 2017). The purpose was to look at the meeting topics in order to see if there was a
pattern of which topics the North African representatives mentioned when they served as
Security Council President for the month. In one case, the Libyan state representatives served
Security Council President twice, once in 2008 and once in 2009. The results were compared
among the North African states, and also to the other states serving at the time. I created a coding
system for the meeting topics and tallied the number of times topics were mentioned. When each
state on the Security Council served as President, topics were tallied during that month to see
how many times states brought up certain issues. The coding scheme is shown in Table 7.
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Table 7: Coding for Security Council Meeting Topics in Selected Years: 2001, 2004, 2008,
2009, 2012, and 2016
Issue
Issue- Africa

Meeting Topics
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Issue- MENA

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Issue- international
security

•
•
•

“Peace and security in Africa”
“Security Council Mission -- Africa”
“Peace consolidation in West Africa”
“UN West Africa Office”
“The situation in” (any African state)
Name of any African state or region
“Situation along the borders of” (African states)
“Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South
Sudan”
Briefing / report by UN leader focused on an African state
“International Tribunal- Rwanda”
“International Tribunal- Rwanda and Yugoslavia”
“Meeting with countries contributing troops to” (any UN
African Mission)
“Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and policecontributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex
II, sections A and B” (any African state)
“The situation in the Middle East”
“Middle East Situation”
“The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian
question”
“Nonproliferation-- Iran”
Name of any MENA state
“Middle East --” (any MENA state)
“The situation in” (any MENA state)
“Middle East — UNDOF” or “UNIFIL”
“Meeting with countries contributing troops to the” (any UN
MENA mission)
“Meeting of the Security Council with the troop- and policecontributing countries pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex
II, sections A and B” (any MENA state)
“Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”
“Non-proliferation”
“Maintenance of international peace and security: Nuclear
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Issue- Asia

•
•
•
•
•
•

Issue- Europe

•
•
•
•
•
•

Issue- Latin America
& Caribbean

•
•
•
•
•

nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament”
“Small arms”
“Prevention of armed conflicts”
“Peace and security”
“Peace and security — terrorist acts”
“Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist
acts”
“Maintenance of international peace and security”
“Maintenance of peace and security”
“Women and peace and security”
“Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and sub
regional organizations in maintaining international peace and
security”
“Name of any Asian state”
“Nonproliferation-- Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”
“Meeting with countries contributing troops to the UN
Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste”
“Meeting with countries contributing troops to the UN
Transitional Administration in East Timor”
“Report of the Secretary-General — Nepal”
“Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for
United Nations assistance in support of its peace process”
Name of any European state
“Situation in” (any European state)
“Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe”
“International Tribunal- Yugoslavia”
“International Tribunal- Rwanda and Yugoslavia”
“Meeting with countries contributing troops to the (UN
European Mission)”; “Security Council resolutions 1160
(1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999)
- Kosovo”
Name of any Latin American / Caribbean state
“The situation in” (any Latin American / Caribbean state)
“Security Council mission — Haiti”
“Diplomatic relations — Brazil”
“Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent
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Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to
the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council
(S/2016/53)”
Issue- Administrative

•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Issue- General
Peacekeeping (not
country specific)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Issue- Other

•
•
•
•

“ICJ — Election”
“Briefing by the President of the International Court of Justice”
“Briefing by ICJ President”
“Briefings by Chairmen of subsidiary bodies of the Security
Council; Implementation of the note by the President of the
Security Council (S/2010/507)”
“Security Council - working methods”
“Consideration of the draft report of the Security Council to the
General Assembly”
“Wrap-up discussion on the work of the Security Council for
the month of” (insert month)
“Annual report of the Security Council to the General
Assembly”
“Appointment of Secretary-General”
“Tribute to Secretary General”
“Recommendation for the appointment of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations”
“Post-conflict peacebuilding”
“Peacekeeping operations”
“United Nations peacekeeping operations”
“HIV/AIDS and international peacekeeping operations”
“Peace and security: role of the Security Council in supporting
security sector reform”
“Role of civil society in post-conflict peace-building”
“Peace-building”
“Role of business in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and postconflict peace-building”
“Meeting with countries contributing troops to the United
Nations Disengagement Observer Force”; “Strengthening
cooperation with troop-contributing countries”
“Children and armed conflict”
“Civilians in armed conflict”
“Protection of civilians in armed conflict”
“Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed
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•
•
•
•
•

conflict”
“Respect for international humanitarian law”
“Nobel Peace Prize”
“Sanctions”
“General issues relating to sanctions”
“Briefing by UN High Commissioner for Refugees”

Source: UN Security Council Meeting Records: 2001, 2004, 2008, 2009, 2012, and 2016

Specifically regarding certain meeting topics, if two different states were brought up, for
instance, “International Tribunal- Rwanda and Yugoslavia,” both regions mentioned (in this case
Africa and Europe) received tallies. However, with a topic such as “Peace and security in
Africa,” only the “Issue- Africa’ category received a tally, not the “Issue- International Security”
because the regional focus was most important for this study. Any mention of a state, region, or
continent, in a meeting topic was categorized under that regional issue. The same boundaries for
MENA as described in the first study apply to this categorization as well. For the other regions,
the following boundaries apply:

Africa: All states on the African continent minus the North African states of Morocco, Libya,
Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt
Europe: All states in Western and Eastern Europe, including Turkey
Asia: All states east of Afghanistan and Pakistan
Latin America and Caribbean: All states south of Mexico, including the Caribbean islands

I calculated the number of topics for each state who served as Security Council President
were calculated, and the percentages of each state out of the total number of topics. Tables
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including all Security Council meeting data broken down in the selected years can be found in
the Appendix.
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General Debate: The Permanent Five Members
The conclusion of the first study of MENA states’ participation in the General Assembly Debates
was that there is a distinct pattern of MENA-region specific topics brought up, which indicates a
regional identity. However, this pattern of issue prioritization was not compared to any states
outside of MENA to see if this may be a general pattern. For this comparison, I chose the
Permanent Five (P5) members of the Security Council and used the same methodology to
analyze the General Assembly Debate transcripts during the same timeframe. The P5 were
chosen because they are the biggest decision-makers in the Security Council and some of the
most involved states in the United Nations and around the world. The logic was if the MENA
issues are important enough to be discussed by the P5, who have many interests around the
world, then these are issues that states outside of MENA region also find important. This
comparison is done to test the analysis of the MENA identity as “unique” based on the
prioritization of regional topics.
Also, as the most powerful states, the P5 are able to influence international events more
than others by their veto power on Security Council resolutions and monetary contributions
around the world. Essentially, their views impact UN action the most of any states, and therefore
it is interesting to see what issues they prioritize. The P5 is also an interesting group to look at
because they do not necessarily have a unified stance on issues such as Palestine and Syria,
whereas the MENA states generally do. As with the MENA states before, the main topics that
were examined in the General Assembly Debate transcripts for the P5 were the Palestinian
Conflict, the Syrian Conflict (2012-on), International Security, and UN reform.
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Palestine
In the MENA study, the Palestinian Conflict was the strongest and most unified issue, however,
based on the findings below, there was not as strong of a pattern for the P5.

Table 8: P5 States’ Discussion of Palestinian Conflict in General Debate, 2009-2016
State / Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
U.S.

x

x

x

x

x

x

Russia

x

x

x

x

x

x

U.K.

x

x

x

x

x

France

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

China

x

x
x

Source: Past General Assembly Debates, 2009 - 2016
While in most years, the issue of Palestine was discussed by more than half of the group,
and in the instances of 2011, 2012, and 2013, the every state discussed them. Despite the varying
views from the P5 that I will discuss next, it is important to note the difference in perspective of
this issue from the MENA states to the P5. While for most of the MENA states the issue of
Palestine is an issue of recognition and social justice, the P5 states come from a conflict
resolution and containment perspective. Although this conflict is prioritized by the P5, the states
often do not discuss the situation in the same manner as the MENA states in the General Debate.
The results do indicate a pattern, although it is not as strong as the MENA states during the same
timeframe.
The U.S. and Russian state delegations mentioned Palestine the most of the P5. This
could be explained by the historic involvement of the U.S. and Russia as members of The
Quartet on the Middle East. The U.S. proposed a two-state solution, with the states living side-
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by-side, in every year studied. U.S. President Obama expressed support for both sides of the
Conflict, but often reiterated its commitment to Israel and Israel’s security (Obama 2009-2014).
In 2016, he stated “Israelis and Palestinians will be better off if Palestinians reject incitement and
recognize the legitimacy of Israel, but Israel recognizes that it cannot permanently occupy and
settle Palestinian land” (Obama 2016). So although there is commitment to a two-state solution,
President Obama emphasized the U.S.’ relations with Israel. The Russian state representatives
also brought up Palestine the most, and were the only state to continuously prioritize the need to
mobilize the Quartet. This was seen in 2009 and 2013 (Medvedev 2009) and (Lavrov 2013).
Although the European Union is a member of the Quartet, the U.K., France, and China
also are not as direct of players in the coalition. UK representatives David Cameron and Nick
Clegg showed support for a two-state solution to the conflict, which was framed as pretty neutral
to both sides, but in 2011 Cameron showed strong support for a Palestinian state (Cameron 2011
and 2012) and (Clegg 2013). French President Hollande stressed the importance of starting peace
talks again in 2012 and 2013, which was very different from his predecessor’s message in 2011,
where he said that the solution was up to Israel and Palestine, but other states should help a little
(Sarkozy 2011) and (Hollande 2012 and 2013).
China has mentioned the Palestinian Conflict the least of the P5. The Chinese
representatives have been as inconsistent about its dialogue of the Palestinian Conflict as it has
mentioned the conflict in the General Debate over the years. For example, in 2012, Minister
Jiechi showed support for Palestine at the General Debate, whereas in 2013, Minister Yi did not
talk about China’s stance on the issue, but in 2014 called for a ceasefire, and for Israel to stop the
blockade on Palestinian territories (Jiechi 2012) and (Yi 2013 and 2014). This inconsistency of
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mentions about the conflict may be because of China’s geographical distance and lack of
involvement in the issue of Palestine.
However, there is one disparity in 2015, where none of the P5 mentioned the Palestinian
issue. The P5 state representatives focused more on the Middle East generally in their General
Debate speeches in this year. This could possibly be because of the escalating nature of the
Conflict. Another reason may be because the last time the Quartet on the Middle East met was in
May 2015, and soon afterward Special Envoy Tony Blair resigned, whom many critics thought
was ineffective in the negotiations (Black and Beaumont 2015). Perhaps the silence on the
Palestinian issue by the P5 was due to the failures of the Quartet that previous May. The
prioritization of the Palestinian Conflict did not prove to be as strong of a pattern for the P5
states as it did for the MENA states, however, there is still a present pattern.

Syrian Conflict
The Syrian Conflict was another consistent issue prioritized by the MENA region during the
General Assembly Debates, so it is necessary to compare to the P5 to see if this is unique to the
MENA region, or a common pattern among other state members.
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Table 9: P5 States’ Discussion of Syrian Conflict in General Debate, 2012-2016
State / Year

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

U.S.

x

x

x

x

x

Russia

x

x

x

x

x

U.K.

x

x

x

x

x

France

x

x

x

x

x

China

x

x

x

x

Source: Past General Assembly Debates, 2009 - 2016

Compared to the topic of the Palestinian Conflict, the Syrian Conflict has a much
stronger pattern of mentions by the P5 states. Although the time frame is shorter, the P5 all
mentioned Syria once the conflict started escalating. This makes sense seeing as almost every P5
state is involved in the conflict, in some capacity. It is also not surprising that China was the only
P5 state not to mention Syria during the chosen timeframe, seeing as China is not as directly
involved as the other P5 members, but this only occurred once.
There is a wide range of discussion and views of the Syrian Conflict across the P5 states.
President Obama called for an end to the President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in 2012 (Obama
2012). In 2015, President Obama focused more on defeating the Islamic State, but stated the
need for a political transition (Obama 2015). As Russia is a long ally of the Syrian government,
it was seen in 2012, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called for a ceasefire in Syria, and
in 2013, recognized that the Syrian Conflict was a problem, but there needed to be evidence that
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chemical weapons were used (Lavrov 2012 and 2013). In 2016, he also praised the Russian
military’s assistance, which kept the Syrian government in control and prevented collapse of the
state (Lavrov 2016).
The U.K. and French representatives took strong stances towards removing President
Assad year after year. In 2012, Prime Minister Cameron stated that Syria’s future “ is a future
without Al-Assad” (Cameron 2012). Secretary of State Philip Hammond in 2015 talked about
Syria in more long-term dialogue, stating the need for political settlement after Assad and defeat
of ISIS, and what it will take to rebuild Syria (Hammond 2015). President Hollande of France
expressed outward support for the Syrian rebels in 2012 and 2014, and in 2015, stated that
President Assad “is at the origin of the problem; he cannot be part of the solution” (Hollande
2012, 2014 and 2015). Lastly, the Chinese representatives talked about the Syrian Conflict
generally. In 2013, Minister of Affairs Wang Yi stated a need for a ceasefire, but did not mention
specific parties involved (Yi 2013). In 2016, Premier of China’s state Council, Li Keqiang,
ascertained that Syria was a political conflict with a political solution involving all players
(Keqiang 2016). Despite the varying views and proposed solutions to the Syrian Conflict among
the P5 states, the findings show that the Syrian Conflict is a priority the P5 as well and as the
MENA states.
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International Security
A commitment to international security shows a similar pattern of the Syrian Conflict: no
less than 4 out of 5, or 80%, of the P5 member states, brought up this topic each year in 2009 2016. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, it is the P5’s responsibility to lead
efforts in the maintenance of international peace and security, so this pattern is unsurprising.

UN Reform
As I found in the MENA states analysis, advocating for UN reform was a weaker pattern,
however, I believe this is for different reasoning. There were not many MENA states that
brought up reform in the General Debates in 2009 - 2016, which I attributed to the difficulty and
unlikeliness of UN reform to occur. For these states, there was often a call for more fair
representation on the Security Council, or re-structuring of the United Nations, to better reflect
the world now. Similarly, a weak pattern was also found with the P5 states, where the norm was
50% or less of the P5 mentioning a need for reform.
While the proposed reforms were similar to the MENA states, I would argue that the P5
do not bring up UN reform often because the current system and structure favors them. By
adding more states to the Security Council, the P5’s dominance and power in the body could be
diluted and perhaps undermined. To further illustrate this point, the U.S.’ representative
President Obama did not mention UN reform once between 2009 and 2016, and was the only P5
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state to do so. The United Nations and post-Cold War world order favors the U.S. as the most
powerful state in the world. The U.S. most likely would not want anything to change as the
current system fits its interests. This result relates back to Zweifel’s argument that the United
Nations, especially the Security Council, was not meant to be democratic or representative
(2006). Although this pattern was inconsistent among the P5, it makes sense that UN reform is a
less-discussed topic with these specific states.

General Debate Results
The overall results were that MENA and the P5 both consistently prioritized the Palestinian and
Syrian Conflicts, with MENA prioritizing Palestine slightly more often and the P5 prioritizing
Syria slightly more often. The P5 focused on international security topics more frequently than
MENA, and both MENA and the P5 states infrequently mentioned UN reform. Although the
comparison was not perfect due to the different sizes of the two groups studied, the general
patterns were more important than the specific ratio between the two groups. From these
findings, it could be concluded that claiming the MENA region’s identity is unique based on
General Assembly Debates is not true. As was found, states outside of the region also prioritized
issues in the MENA region, proving that this is not a MENA-specific indicator of regional
identity.
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The expansion of this study to the P5 states provided a different conclusion than was
found in the original study of the MENA region only. Despite the conclusion that the MENA
identity is not as unique as was originally thought, I believe a MENA seat is still necessary for
the Security Council. Although the P5 do prioritize these MENA conflicts almost as often as the
MENA states themselves in the General Debates, the conflicts still continue without resolution or
effective action from the Security Council. Although it cannot be said that the MENA states
would bring a unique identity to the Security Council based on the prioritization of these issues,
it could be said that recognized MENA representation is still needed to reinforce the importance
of bettering these still-unsolved conflicts in the Security Council.
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Peacebuilding Commission
The Peacebuilding Commission is also an important and powerful agency in the United Nations.
The goal of the Peacebuilding Commission is to delegate a separate body to make decisions,
develop strategies, and make recommendations to UN bodies and outside players, about postconflict peacebuilding (“United Nations Peacebuilding Commission” 2017). In Moroccan
representative Mr. Taib Fassi Fihri’s Security Council bid during the 2011 General Debate, he
cited Morocco’s involvement in the Peacebuilding Commission as a worthy attribute for election
to the Security Council (Fihri 2011). Taking this into consideration, it still seems that the
membership structure of this body is flawed, especially for MENA representation.
According to the resolution which created the Peacebuilding Commission, the
Organizational Committee states were determined by various bodies: Seven states from the
Security Council and Economic and Social Council, respectively, five states who contributed the
most to the budget, five states who contributed the most peacekeeping troops and police, and
seven nonpermanent states (“United Nations Official Document” 2017). While the resolution
was updated in 2005 to make terms for all member states two years, and emphasized the need for
representation from states in regions that will be discussed by the Peacebuilding Commission,
there are still aspects that are not as representative as they could be (“United Nations Official
Document” 2017).

61
Although the Peacebuilding Commission members are elected from different bodies with
different procedures, there is still continuity in who dominates. The Security Council votes on
seven members, and the permanent and nonpermanent members alike can vote for the
Organizational Committee members. So it is not surprising that the P5 states almost always take
five out of seven spots on the Peacebuilding Committee from the Security Council (“United
Nations Peacebuilding Commission” 2017). As was discussed in the previous section, the P5
states already have much influence with resolutions, major UN decisions, and having their voices
heard, and they also are able to influence the Organizational Committee as well.
Focusing on MENA representation, Egypt is the only state in the previously defined
MENA region elected to the Organizational Committee (“United Nations Peacebuilding
Commission” 2017). As has been seen before, Egypt has served the most times on the Security
Council, and contributes some of the highest number of peacekeeping troops, of the MENA
states. While these are necessary attributes to be elected, there are other MENA states that should
also represent the region as well. MENA is the only geographical region represented by one state
on the Organizational Committee. The data are shown below:

MENA: Egypt
Latin America / Caribbean: Colombia, El Salvador, México, Uruguay, and Argentina
Eastern Europe: Montenegro, Estonia, Russia
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Asia: Indonesia, China, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Republic of Korea
Africa: Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Rwanda
Western Europe and Other: France, United Kingdom, United States, and Belgium

Independent of the P5 states, many of the other states are some of the most powerful
states in their respective regions, like Egypt. Other states that may be categorized similarly are
Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, India, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, and South Africa. While the
representation for MENA and many smaller, less powerful states, is lacking, the representation
for Africa is necessary, especially since all of the states currently on the Peacebuilding
Commission agenda are African states (Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia,
Central African Republic) (United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 2017). While it is
unknown if the lack of representation from the MENA states comes from a lack of interest or
resources, there still seems to be a problem of powerful states participating, and potentially
domination, many aspects of the United Nations. Additionally, as will be seen in the next
section, other aspects of the United Nations also focus heavily on Africa, and the Peacebuilding
Commission is part of these norms.
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MENA State Case Studies
The following section examines norms, representativeness, and how these play into a state’s
projected image. The case studies of Morocco and Saudi Arabia will show how the certain
limitations listed previously restrict state behavior and identity. This is to expand on what was
found in Study 1, where it was found that MENA regional identity is present based on the chosen
vehicles for research.
This section also addresses certain states’ involvement in the United Nations and how
this contributes to the idea of how factors outside of the United Nations can affect actions within
the UN system. There is further analysis done about if the norms and structures of the United
Nations weaken its representativeness and legitimacy, which was also focused on in Study 1.
Specific states are used to take a more focused and in-depth look, whereas before the region was
looked at more generally.
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Morocco
The Moroccan delegation is highly involved in U.N. initiatives, especially involving
counterterrorism efforts. Morocco was the Chair of the Counter Terrorism Committee of the
United Nations in 2013, and a member of both the United Nations Counter-Terrorism
Implementation Task Force, as well as the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
In addition, Morocco hosted the United Nations Global Forum Countering Terrorism
workshop in 2012, and also hosted the first meeting for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism in its capital, Rabat, in 2006. Morocco is clearly promoting its commitment to
counterterrorism, not to mention serving as a partner to several European states and the U.S. in
intelligence and security efforts outside of the United Nations. In 2015, a UN Human Rights
Council report recognized Morocco’s intelligence agency as the most powerful in MENA, and
commended its effectiveness of preventing terrorist attacks (Morocco World News 2015). In the
2011 session of the General Assembly Debate, Taïb Fassi Fihri, Minister for Foreign Affairs and
Cooperation of Morocco, advocated for Morocco to serve on the Security Council in the 20122013 session.
Fihri cited Morocco’s contributions to peacekeeping, as well as ambitions to support
areas outside of MENA such as sub-Saharan Africa and the Pacific, as evidence of Morocco’s
suitability for the position (2011). Due to this demonstration of commitment, along with

65
consistent contributions of peacekeeping troops, it was originally thought that the member states
rewarded Morocco with a Security Council bid in 2011.
However, after studying the pattern of the “rotating Arab Seat,” it seemed only natural
that Morocco would serve on the Security Council at that time because it was the state’s “turn.”
On the other hand, the Southern Provinces in Morocco have long been a source of conflict
between the Moroccan government and the United Nations, and around the same time, the
situation was not improving. Morocco’s election to the Security Council despite this violation of
upholding peace and security could indicate that structural norms can also benefit the MENA
states too. As discussed before, the North African states have a consistent pattern of rotation, so
it could be said that Morocco would have been elected to the Security Council anyways since it
was its turn. This demonstrates how overarching norms in the United Nations may control states’
actions. This case explores the ideas of norms through a focus on Morocco and the North African
states.

Southern Provinces
The Southern Provinces in Morocco have long been a topic of contention between the United
Nations and Moroccan leadership, most recently seen when Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon
called the Southern Provinces an “occupation” by Morocco, leading to the firing of many UN
workers by Moroccan leadership (Charbonneau 2016). The United Nations Mission for the
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Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in the Southern Provinces has the goal of
facilitating a “transitional period for the preparation of a referendum in which the people of
Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco,” since the
1991 ceasefire agreement (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 2017).
This has led to conflict between Morocco and the United Nations, as Moroccan leadership
praised a Security Council approved-initiative to solve the dispute in the General Debates of
2009 and 2011, but in reality progress has not been made and there is still not a solution (Fihri
2009 and 2011).
While I originally thought that Morocco was elected to the Security Council partially
because of improvement relating to the Southern Provinces, the norm of election to the Security
Council for the North African states seems to be strong based on the previously discussed
pattern. Recently in 2016, it was reported that talks between the United Nations and Morocco
were in occurrence, and potentially tensions between the two are subsiding, but when Morocco
was seeking Security Council election in 2011 the conflict was not improving (Charbonneau
2016).
In 2011, MINURSO was renewed by the Security Council, showing that there was no
resolution to this conflict, and according to Human Rights Watch, is the only peacekeeping
mission to not have a human rights component, which the Moroccan government has allegedly
opposed (Human Rights Watch 2012). In 2011, Human Rights Watch also reported that the

67
Moroccan government shut down the Al-Jazeera branch in Morocco due to their coverage of the
Western Sahara conflict (Human Rights Watch 2012). For the year 2011, Freedom House gave
the Western Sahara situation the label of “Not Free,” with the worst rankings in the categories of
civil liberties and political rights, and they cited cases of censorship, and prohibition of freedom
of press and assembly as evidence for this ranking (“Western Sahara 2012). The Moroccan
government’s treatment of the Southern Province situation is not in line with the Security
Council’s mission, and it is surprising based on the long-lasting nature of this conflict that
Morocco was elected to the Security Council (UN Security Council 2017). At this point, the
situation in the Southern Provinces was not improving, and it seems as if it continues to be an
issue. If the North African rotation did not have the current pattern, perhaps Morocco would not
be elected to the Security Council or confirmed due to this United Nations-involved conflict.
While in the first study, the focus was on how dividing MENA is not good for the states,
this study examines how the current system may benefit the MENA states. The situation in the
Southern Provinces is clearly not an example of Moroccan government following the mission of
the Security Council because the unrest in the Southern Provinces could contribute to the
already-present security threats in the area (Fourth Committee 2017). The fairness of the Security
Council rotation in the North African states allowed Morocco to be elected to the Security
Council despite this issue. This case also shows how issues outside of the United Nations
systems may not influence relations with states as much as one may think. As mentioned before,
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this long-contested conflict does not seem to influence the system of election to the Security
Council. Further flaws in the UN system involving elections will be seen in the following case
study as well.

Security Council Meeting Results
Previously, elections to the Security Council and General Debate transcripts have been
examined for patterns of a unified and distinct MENA identity. Following Morocco’s election to
the Security Council, which as discussed before, may have been more a cause of structural norms
rather than merit, it seemed that Security Council meeting topics could also be an indicator of
this identity as well.
Focusing on Morocco and the other North African states, I looked at the last time each of
the state representatives served on the Security Council, and what topics headlined the meetings
they led as Security Council President, compared with the other states on the Security Council at
the time. The position allows the representative to set the agenda and control the conversation.
My expectation for this research was to find that Morocco and the North African states as a
group would bring up topics about MENA and international security more often than states
outside of the region. The codebook in the Methodology section shows how the different
meeting topics are categorized, and the breakdown of the different topics by Security Council
session can be found in the Appendix.

69
A major pattern I looked for was if the North African states focused on topics related to
Africa or MENA more. I expected to find, as I did with the General Assembly Debates, that
topics of MENA, especially those involving security issues, would be brought up more
consistently.
I started with Morocco, who has a clear focus on international security and representing
the Arab World by vying for the rotating Arab Seat. When the Moroccan representative served as
Security Council President in December 2012, it was found that more meetings were focused on
African topics, which were 8 out of 21 meetings (38%). In comparison, the President focused
only 3 out of 21(about 14%) meeting topics about MENA issues, and only 2 out of 21 meetings
about general issues related to international security (10%). These findings were surprising, as I
expected the Moroccan representative would bring up MENA and international security more,
especially seeing as MENA does not have a reserved seat on the Security Council to advocate
fully for the MENA region.
However, these findings alone do not prove underlying norms or a collective pattern
prevail over states’ own interests. Following this, I looked at when the North African states of
Libya (January 2008 & March 2009), Tunisia (February 2001), Algeria (December 2004), and
Egypt (May 2016), the year they were Security Council president within that term, which is
indicated in parentheses above. Overwhelmingly, the pattern was the same with all of the other
North African states. The meetings were most often focused on Africa, and less so with MENA

70
and international security. There was as much of a disparity of the Tunisian representative’s time
as President in February 2001, when African topics headlined 60% of the meetings, MENA
headlined 7%, and international security 0%, during that month. The rest of the data can be
found in the Appendix. Based on this strong pattern, it seems that there are collective norms in
the North African region that have prioritized African issues at Security Council meetings over
MENA issues.
With further research on these Security Council meetings, the pattern of African issues
being prioritized was also found with the other states serving on the Security Council. While it
was a demonstrated pattern that African topics were brought up more often than MENA topics
by Security Council presidents, it goes beyond that. It was found that there is a overall pattern of
African topics being the focus of meetings for almost all states every year, more than any other
topics (exact numbers can be seen in the Appendix). While this does not apply to every state, it
was an overall trend that occurred.
This result shows that this collective focus on Africa in Security Council meetings goes
beyond the North African region, as this applied to almost all states that served. It appears that
the North African states do not have a distinct identity when looking at the Security Council
meetings. Rather, it seems that there is an underlying global prioritization of African issues being
the most vital or pressing to peace and security. Additionally, perhaps African topics are
discussed more because the region is recognized in the Security Council as one of the major

71
geographical blocs. It can be said that there appear to be norms functioning in the UN system,
which may affect state’s actions, based on this overall pattern.
Turning focus back to Morocco, I noted that Morocco appears to follow norms just the
same as the other states. While Morocco and the other North African states expressed the
importance of solving the Palestinian and Syrian issues during the General Assembly Debates
analyzed from 2009-2016, it would be logical that the state representatives advocate for these
issues as presidents of the Security Council. This lack of prioritization may indicate further these
inherent norms, as the Palestinian and Syrian conflicts were consistently brought up by the states
in the General Assembly Debate, but not as strongly once on the Security Council.
Although at first glance, Morocco’s election and participation on the Security Council
appeared to be an example of a committed state representing the interests of an unrecognized
region, it may have ended up being a victim to strong, structural norms in the UN system.
Morocco had proven a commitment to international security with its involvement in other facets
of the United Nations, but its representative did not focus too often on this topic. Through this
study of Morocco, it can be seen that norms may be constraints to the North African states and
influence state action within the UN system.
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Saudi Arabia
Historically, Saudi Arabia has been vying for leadership in the Islamic world, usually competing
with Shi’a religious power Iran in the region (Mabon, 2013, p. 2). Both of these states see each
other as leaders in the Middle East, and feel threatened by the other. This is not only a
competition of religious power, but also historical, economic, and political power (Mabon,
2013). While these tensions are outside of the UN system, Saudi Arabia participates less in the
UN system than other states, perhaps as a means of showing leadership for the MENA region.
However, through further research, it is not necessarily true that Saudi Arabia has chosen
not to participate in all aspects of the United Nations, but it has chosen not to participate in the
major bodies of the Security Council and General Debate, which many powerful state leaders
want to be involved in. There are some occurrences where Saudi Arabia does participate, and I
argue that this inconsistency may be because Saudi leadership is frustrated with the UN structure
and whichever image matches their interests at the time.

Absence from General Assembly Debates
In the selected years of analysis for the General Assembly debates, Saudi Arabia attended
only two of the seven sessions. Out of the 22 states studied throughout this project (the MENA +
P5 states), Saudi Arabia is the only state to be absent from any of the General Assembly Debates.
When in attendance in 2015, Saudi’s representative, Mr. Adel Ahmed Al-Jubeir, stressed MENA
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conflicts of Palestine, Syria, and Yemen, non-proliferation in Iran, and terrorism, while ending
with a need for reform of the United Nations (Al-Jubeir, 2015). This makes Saudi Arabia one of
two MENA states that year to bring up UN reform (the other being Algeria). In Saudi’s other
General Assembly Debate appearance in 2012, Saudi leadership mentioned UN reform, most
likely because of frustration with the UN structure (Abdulaziz 2012). It was seen before that the
Security Council structure recognizes the power of the P5 states. UN Secretary-General Antonio
Gueterres called Saudi Arabia “an important pillar of stability in the region and in the world as
well as a key global player and a key pillar of multilateralism.” However, the structure of the
United Nations does not favor all states, no matter how powerful they may be. This concept can
be seen in the following section.

Denial of Security Council Seat
Saudi Arabia ran for election to the UN Security Council for the 2012 - 2013 session, and
won the seat. This would have been Saudi Arabia’s first time serving on the Security Council.
However, Saudi Arabia’s leadership ended up denying the seat, stating its reasons for denial in a
letter to the United Nations available on the UN website (Al-Mouallimi 2013). This was the first
time a state has ever won election to the Security Council, and subsequently denied the seat. In
the letter, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Saudi Arabia stated that the “...mechanisms of
action and double standards existing in the Security Council prevent it from performing its duties
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and assuming its responsibilities towards preserving international peace and security as required”
(Al-Mouallimi 2013). The representative also discussed long-standing conflicts in the region: the
Palestinian cause, presence of weapons of mass destruction in MENA, and the Syrian Conflict,
as instances of “the Security Council’s inability to carry out its duties and assume its
responsibilities” (Al-Mouallimi 2013). The statement ended with the Saudi Arabian
representative stating the Kingdom’s “historical responsibilities towards its people,” (“people”
meaning Arab and Islamic nations) (Al-Mouallimi 2013).
An analysis of this letter, combined with the absences from the General Assembly
Debates, draws several conclusions. First, Saudi Arabia is frustrated by the structure and norms
of the United Nations, especially the Security Council, relating to its capacity and ability to solve
problems in the MENA region. Second, by denying to sit on the major decision-making body of
the United Nations, Saudi Arabian leadership is choosing not to participate in UN actions to help
MENA, but may think that it can do more without the United Nations. Third, the government of
Saudi Arabia is essentially protesting the ineffectiveness of the United Nations for the MENA
region with its absence, as opposed to voicing these concerns and critiques through participation.
Lastly, as one of the major powers in the MENA region, it seems that Saudi Arabian leadership
may feel a duty to not be part of a body that does not help their region and people.
Due to the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, Saudi Arabian leadership may have taken this
opportunity to assert its commitment to MENA by making an unprecedented statement. I think
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the Saudi Arabian government made this decision because they wanted to project the image of
regional leadership. It has been observed by some analysts of leadership in the MENA region
that the Saudi Arabian government has been taking a more assertive approach to its leadership to
fill a “perceived vacuum,” especially through military action, which is likely stimulated by the
threat of Iran’s leadership (Shanahan 2015).
This assertive approach to leadership can also be seen in the denial of the Security
Council seat. Tying in the idea of norms, the structure and norms of the United Nations may
have compromised Saudi Arabia’s perceived ability to keep up the image of being a leader in
MENA if they had taken the Security Council seat, which may be why they chose to deny it. The
issue of norms was found to be a problem with the previous case study of Morocco and the other
North African states, where states may not have been able to focus on topics they wanted. Saudi
Arabia’s chosen absence could be not only a sign that norms do have a role in the UN system,
but also that state’s roles outside of the United Nations can impact their actions within the
system.

Human Rights Council Election
Similar to the Security Council, the Human Rights Council is also an organization that does not
recognize MENA as a region in its elections and representation. The role of the Human Rights
Council is “strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe and for
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addressing situations of human rights violations and make recommendations…” (“Welcome to
the Human Rights Council” 2017). These 47 states are voted onto the Human Rights Council by
the General Assembly, and are voted on by the following standards in waves:

African States: 13 seats
Asia-Pacific States: 13 seats
Latin American and Caribbean States: 8 seats
Western European and Other States: 7 seats
Eastern European States: 6 seats

Saudi Arabia was recently re-elected to one of four spots to the Human Rights Council to
serve until 2019, representing the Asia group (Human Rights Watch 2016). There were only four
states running, and China, Japan, and Iraq were the other states that ran and were elected (Human
Rights Watch 2016). This is an interesting election seeing as Saudi Arabia is not known for
human rights. In 2017, Freedom House ranked Saudi Arabia “7” on its “Freedom of the World”
Rating scale, with a status of “Not Free,” which is the worst score a state can earn (“Saudi Arabia
| Country Report | Freedom in the World). Saudi Arabia has also received criticism for arrests of
political opposition, flawed trials, and bombing campaigns in Yemen, all of which have
contributed to Saudi’s low human rights record (Human Rights Watch 2017). According to the
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World Economic Forum gender gap rankings, Saudi Arabia ranked 134 out of 145 countries
(The Global Gender Gap Report 2015). As Human Rights Watch noted, despite this reputation,
Saudi Arabia was elected due to the uncontested nature of the election, whereas Russia, who was
in a contested election and has a slightly better human rights reputation, was not elected (Human
Rights Watch 2016).
This shows that there are flaws in the elections to the Human Rights Council, if states
with terrible human rights reputations can be elected to a global body that oversees human rights.
This also raises the question of why Saudi Arabia would want to serve on the Human Rights
Council, since it would appear upholding of human rights is not seen as a priority. Not only is
Saudi Arabian delegation participating in the United Nations, but also the delegation is
participating in a body of the United Nations focused on a topic that Saudi Arabian leadership is
not known for. Potentially, Saudi Arabia’s representatives want to show the world that they are
committed to human rights, despite what has been recorded.
In looking at the Saudi Press Agency, which was created by the Saudi government and is
now a “General Commission” overseen by the Minister of Culture and Information for Saudi
Arabia, there are several press statements that focus on the Saudi Arabian leadership’s
commitment to human rights (Al-Toraifi 2017). In February 2017, there was a brief press release
about the President of Human Rights Commission Dr. Bandar bin Mohammed Al-Aiban
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discussing Saudi Arabia government’s “efforts in supporting human rights issues” with the
Swedish Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Jan Knutsson (Saudi Press Agency 2017).
The function of a press release is to update about an event or issue, usually briefly, and
that is what the nature of this statement was. This may show that public knowledge of the
meeting was important, but not necessarily more detail. While this is not known for certain, the
release is only two sentences, and just informs the reader that the meeting happened and focused
on human rights. It could be that the point was to show evidence that Saudi Arabia leadership is
committed to this issue.
There was another press statement related to human rights also in early February 2017
that was longer in nature, which detailed Saudi Arabia and the Organization for Islamic
Cooperation’s affiliated Human Rights Organization agreement to make Saudi Arabia the
“headquarter host country” for the organization, providing “resources and facilities, to guarantee
realizing effective performance of the independent body” (Saudi Govt, OIC Human Rights
Organization Co-sign Headquarters' Accord 2017). This further shows the Saudi Arabian
government showing a commitment to human rights through meetings and supporting
organizations committed to the topic. Sitting on the Human Rights Council could also be a part
of fostering this public image of commitment to human rights, which benefits Saudi Arabian
leadership. This is contrasted with Saudi Arabian leadership deciding that absence from the
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Security Council was the best move for its image then, but election to the Human Rights Council
provided Saudi Arabian leadership with an opportunity to further this commitment.
It is also important to note the structural failure of the elections to the Human Rights
Council, which allowed a state heavily criticized for its human rights record to sit on an
organization, which oversees human rights. This ties into the idea of powerful states that have
the ability to be involved in the United Nations (in Saudi’s cause, when they desire) dominating
the UN system. While the Human Rights Council members are voted on democratically with a
number of spots put aside regionally, it should be questioned if it is worth it to allow states like
Saudi Arabia to serve in the organ.
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Conclusions of Study 2
Based on this elaboration from the original case study of the MENA states, I argue that the UN
system does not allow for a MENA identity as strongly as expected. The prioritization of
Palestine and Syria, thought to be a MENA-specific pattern in the General Assembly Debates,
turned out to be a priority to the P5 member states as well. Since the P5 states also highly
prioritize these MENA conflicts, I question why the Security Council has not passed more
effective resolutions towards them. There is clearly some disparity, as the P5 always have a
chance to determine on what the Security Council should focus every term.
Looking at vetoes and resolutions on the Security Council related to the Palestinian and
Syrian Conflicts, and comparing between the MENA and P5 states could expand this research.
This could be an interesting comparison to see if the P5 and MENA states on the Security
Council were on the same page about these issues, and could further speak to the dynamic of the
powerful states.
With the case study of Morocco and the North African states in the Security Council,
common patterns of meeting topics were found between most states that served on the Security
Council during the selected years. I found no greater prioritization of MENA issues, and there
was an overall prioritization of African issues by most states during the timeframe, no matter
what region a state came from. The overwhelming pattern of African topics dominating the
Security Council may indicate UN norms. It seems too present to just be a coincidence,
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especially for states very distant from Africa. While there are undoubtedly pressing issues in
Africa, I question if this pattern causes other issues to be neglected, as the African issues are
discussed a large portion of the Security Council term.
The case study of Saudi Arabia showed two different aspects of the structural constraints
of the UN; one, how states can be affected by the restrictions, and two, how there are democratic
elements that can harm the legitimacy of certain UN organs. It seems that state leadership such
as Saudi Arabia may capitalize on weaknesses of the United Nations to further their own
leadership in their region to fulfill outside motives. The UN can probably serve as an effective
platform for states to do this due to its high visibility and widespread involvement.
Based on my research, Morocco and Saudi Arabia did not necessarily have the best
attributes to be respectively elected to the Security Council and Human Rights Council, but yet
they won these elections. This relates back to the idea of states that have the capability to be
involved in the United Nations dominating the system. Both Morocco’s Southern Province
situation and Saudi Arabia’s human rights reputation are clear infractions of the missions of the
Security Council and Human Rights Council, and yet they were rewarded in the system with
positions. This truly hurts the legitimacy of these organizations, and the United Nations as a
whole, as I am sure there are similar infractions in other organs.
Perhaps because these infractions occurred outside of the UN system, it did not affect the
states’ elections within the UN system. This perceived lack of accountability for actions outside
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of the United Nations could be a flaw of having strong norms and the current system in the
United Nations. While the previous part explored that the current system of the UN is unfair to
MENA, the case studies showed ways the MENA states may have benefited from the democratic
elements in the current system. From this study, it seems that norms within the United Nations
can become embedded as part of the structure, which may lead to uneven discussion of topics
and undeserving states earning positions in the United Nations.
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Conclusion
While each study provided different results and analysis of the UN structure, I focused on
common themes of representation and legitimacy throughout the two studies. I found that while
there are some aspects of the United Nations that are lacking in democratic elements and fair
representation, such as the Security Council, even the aspects that have fair democratic
procedures, such as the Peacebuilding Commission and Human Rights Council, are harmed by
the structure of the United Nations, and could be deemed as illegitimate.
There is an overall problem of states using different UN organs as a platform to portray
an image, and once actually being in a decision-making position, being unable to act in the
manner they may have wished. This can be seen with the difference in MENA and P5 states
consistently prioritizing topics such as the Palestinian and Syrian conflicts in the General Debate,
but once elected to the Security Council, a body that may allow these states to have a role in
ameliorating these conflicts, they either cannot or do not.
While I discussed the role of norms on the Security Council, I think there is also a
disparity of how these states want to be viewed on the world stage, but then how these states act
once behind closed doors and matched against other powerful states. All of this makes me
question the legitimacy of the General Debate in determining if the issues discussed are truly
what UN state members prioritize, or just what is convenient for them to show they are
prioritizing. A regional leader like Saudi Arabia may have an interest in appearing highly
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engaged in solving the conflicts of Palestine and Syria, but when given the chance to potentially
make a difference in UN actions towards these conflicts on the Security Council, it was denied
by Saudi leadership to maybe suit their own interests.
As mentioned before with the MENA seat, the United Nations is not an adaptable
organization because of its difficult reform process. Looking further, another failure is the
precedent-setting nature of every decision and structural reform made to the United Nations.
Instead of taking things on a situational basis, the United Nations is expected to make a decision
once and uphold this no matter what. While this is beneficial for consistency within the system,
this is not beneficial when Saudi Arabia is elected to the Human Rights Council. In this very
election, Russia leadership lost the spot on the Human Rights Council because their regional
grouping had a competitive election, and the state does not have a great reputation for human
rights.
However, a state like Saudi Arabia with a worst reputation for human rights was able to
be elected because its regional grouping had a non-competitive election for the four determined
regional spots. This is an instance where ideally, the Human Rights Council should have been
able to limit the number of spots, or deny Saudi Arabia from serving. Saudi Arabian leadership
should probably not be determining policy related to human rights, and organs within the United
Nations should be able to have this autonomy. This is the same with the case of Morocco being
elected to the Security Council with the persisting Southern Provinces conflict. It is unfortunate
that either of these states, and others in different UN organs, are able to serve as decision makers
and influence stakeholders on issues they themselves are struggling with.
This leads to how another major structural flaw is the United Nations being based on
voluntary governance and how this affects its representation and legitimacy. No one can control
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who participates in the UN organs because everything is voluntary. If a state does not have the
capability or desire to serve in any of the organs, then they will not. This is partially what allows
powerful states to dominate many organs in the United Nations. This also means that the United
Nations does have to sacrifice some legitimacy of its organs due to this structure. A certain
number of representatives for UN organs will be elected regardless, and if it is a noncompetitive
election, it may not matter if they are qualified or even deserving of these positions. The
rigidness of the UN structure not only hurts the legitimacy of the UN organs, but also can hurt
the legitimacy of its democracy.
While I originally thought that more democratic elements should be included in the
United Nations, after studying different UN organs, it is hard to fully advocate for this. I still
believe the recognized, consistent MENA seat, along with other sub regional seats, should be
added to the Security Council in the best interest of the organ as legitimately representing the
diversity of the world today, but there is a problem of almost undeserving or unqualified state
members being elected. It is unfair for these states to be allowed to represent stakeholders’
interests and decide their fates, when these state leaders have not demonstrated their ability to do
so. I argue that while democracy for increased and diverse representation is important for the
United Nations’ legitimacy as a world government, there perhaps should be more flexibility in
the structure to ensure the character of this representation matches the mission of the United
Nations.
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Security Council Meeting Topics, Session 2001
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Country
Month
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Ireland
France
Colombia
China
Bangladesh
U.S.
U.K.
Ukraine
Tunisia
Singapore

December
November
October
September
August
July
June
May
April
March
February
January

Topic Topic
Afric MEN
a
A
7
14
9
13
1
4
7
7
3
7
9
7

1
4
1
3
2
2
1
6
1
1

Topic
international
security
1
1
1
4
4

Total
South
America/
Topic
Europe Caribbean

Topic
Asia
2
3
4
2
1
3
2
2
1

3
3

3
3
3
5
2
3
5
4
10
2
5

Topic Topic
Othe Administrat
r
e
4
2
1

2
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Security Council Meeting Selected Topic Percentages, Session 2001

Total %
Total %
President's Africa
MENA
Total % international
Country
discussed
discussed
security
Mali
50%
7%
0%
Jamaica
45%
13%
3%
Ireland
41%
5%
5%
France
57%
0%
4%
Colombia
8%
25%
33%
China
31%
15%
0%
Bangladesh
29%
8%
17%
U.S.
70%
10%
0%
U.K.
30%
0%
0%
Ukraine
27%
23%
12%
Tunisia
60%
7%
0%
Singapore
33%
5%
0%
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Security Council Meeting Topics, Session 2004

President's
Country
Algeria
USA
United
Kingdom
Spain
Russia
Romania
Philippines
Pakistan
Germany
France
China
Chile

Month
December
November
October
September
August
July
June
May
April
March
February
January

Topic Topic
Topic MEN internationa Topic
Africa A
l security
Asia
8
3
2
12
2
4
5
11
5
6
9
4
1
8
5
2

7
3
2
3
5
3
8
4
2
6

5
2
1
2
3
5
4

2
2
2
1
5
1
2
1
1

Total
South
America/
Topic
Caribbea
Europe n
5

2

3
2
3
6
1
6
3
2
3

Topic Topic
Othe Administ
r
e
2

1

2
1

1

2
4
3
1

2
4
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Security Council Meeting Selected Topic Percentages, Session 2004
President's
Country
Algeria
USA
United
Kingdom
Spain
Russia
Romania
Philippines
Pakistan
Germany
France
China
Chile

Total % Africa
discussed

Total % MENA
discussed

Total % international security

50%
46%

19%
8%

20%
52%
45%
38%
36%
20%
5%
36%
42%
10%

28%
14%
18%
19%
20%
15%
36%
18%
17%
30%
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Security Council Meeting Topics, Session 2008

President's
Country
Croatia
Costa Rica
China
Burkina
Faso
Belgium
Vietnam
U.S.
U.K.
South
Africa
Russia
Panama
Libya

Month
December
November
October

Topic Topic Topic
Afric MEN internationa Topic
a
A
l security
Asia
18
9
3
1
7
2
2
1
11
2
2
1

September
August
July
June
May

7
5
11
15
5

2
5
2
5
3

4
3

April
March
February
January

10
5
9
7

6
5
1
4

3
2

3
1

Total
South
America/ Topic Topic
Topic
Caribbea Othe Administrativ
Europe n
r
e
6
1
2
3
2
3
2

1
2
4
2
1

3
6
2
4
2

4
3
1

5
1
3
2

2
2
2
1
2

1
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Security Council Meeting Selected Topic Percentages, Session 2008

President's
Country
Croatia
Costa Rica
China
Burkina
Faso
Belgium
Vietnam
U.S.
U..K
South
Africa
Russia
Panama
Libya

Total %
Africa
discussed
46%
41%
46%

Total %
MENA
discussed
23%
12%
8%

Total %
terrorism/international
security
8%
12%
8%

41%

12%

24%

22%
52%
50%
29%

22%
10%
17%
18%

13%
0%
10%
6%

40%

24%

12%

29%
50%
50%

29%
6%
29%

12%
0%
0%
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Security Council Meeting Topics, Session 2009

President's
Country
Burkina
Faso
Austria
Vietnam
U.S.
U.K.
Uganda
Turkey
Russia
Mexico
Libya
Japan
France

Month
December
November
October
September
August
July
June
May
April
March
February
January

Topic
Africa
18
7
7
5
14
9
8
9
6
3
8

Topic
MEN
A
4
3
2
1
5
2
4
2
3
3
2
5

Topic
Topic
internationa Topic Europ
l security
Asia e
1
2
2
2
1

2

1
3
1

4
2
1

Total
South
America/
Caribbean

Topic Topic
Othe Administra
r
e

2
1
3
1

3
3
2
2
2
2
2

1
4
3
1
2
3

2
2
1

2

3
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Security Council Meeting Selected Topic Percentages, Session 2009

President's
Country
Burkina
Faso
Austria
Vietnam
USA
UK
Uganda
Turkey
Russia
Mexico
Libya
Japan
France

Total %
Africa
discussed

Total %
MENA
discussed

Total % international
security

62%

14%

3%

39%
39%
42%
0%
61%
36%
47%
43%
43%
30%
40%

17%
11%
8%
50%
9%
16%
12%
14%
21%
20%
25%

0%
11%
17%
20%
4%
0%
0%
10%
0%
0%
0%
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Security Council Meeting Topics, Session 2012

President's
Country
Morocco
India
Guatemala
Germany
France
Colombia
China
Azerbaijan
United
States
United
Kingdom
Togo
South
Africa

Month
December
November
October
September
August
July
June
May

Topic
Topic Topic
Internationa
Africa MENA l security
8
3
2
8
7
3
6
2
3
6
3
1
2
5
13
7
9
3
3
7
4
2

Topic
South
America/ Topic Topic
Topic Topic
Caribbea Othe Administrat
Asia Europe n
r
e
2
2
0
0
2
2
0
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
3
2

April

7

8

4

1

March

6

6

1

2

February

9

3

2

3

January

5

4

4

1
3

1
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Security Council Meeting Selected Topic Percentages, Session 2012

Total %
Total %
President's Africa
MENA
Total % international
Country
discussed
discussed
security
Mali
50%
7%
0%
Jamaica
45%
13%
3%
Ireland
41%
5%
5%
France
57%
0%
4%
Colombia
8%
25%
33%
China
31%
15%
0%
Bangladesh
29%
8%
17%
USA
70%
10%
0%
UK
30%
0%
0%
Ukraine
27%
23%
12%
Tunisia
60%
7%
0%
Singapore
33%
5%
0%
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Security Council Meeting Topics, Session 2013 (Control)

President's
Country
France
China
Azerbaijan
Australia
Argentina
U.S.
U.K.
Togo
Rwanda
Russia
Republic
of Korea
Pakistan

Month
December
November
October
September
August
July
June
May
April
March
February
January

Topic
Africa

Topic
MENA
10
10
6
6
4
14
6
8
7
8
7
7

Topic
Total South
International Topic Topic
America/
Topic Topic
security
Asia
Europe Caribbean
Other Administrativ
4
2
1
1
3
1
2
3
2
1
1
1
2
2
1
3
2
1
2
1
5
1
2
2
5
4
1
2
1
2
2
6
1
3
1
1
3
1
3
3

1
3

2
1

2
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Security Council Meeting Selected Topic Percentages, Session 2013

President's
Country

Total % Africa
discussed

France
China
Azerbaijan
Australia
Argentina
U.S.
United Kingdom
Togo
Rwanda
Russia
Republic of Korea
Pakistan

50%
59%
35%
55%
29%
58%
27%
57%
44%
47%
50%
39%

Total %
MENA
discussed
20%
18%
18%
18%
21%
21%
23%
14%
38%
18%
21%
17%

Total % international
security
10%
0%
12%
18%
14%
4%
18%
0%
6%
6%
7%
17%
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Security Council Meeting Topics, 2016

President's
Country
Spain
Senegal
Russia
New
Zealand
Malaysia
Japan
France
Egypt
China
Angola
Venezuela
Uruguay

Month
December
November
October
September
August
July
June
May
April
March
February
January

Topic Topic Topic
Total South
Afric MEN internationa Topic Topic
America/
Topic
a
A
l security
Asia Europe Caribbean
Other
11
12
3
3
2
8
7
4
1
2
4
5
4
3
2
5
12
10
6
12
10
7
9

5
5
6
7
5
7
6
7
3

2
1
1
3
3
2
3
2

1

1

2
1
2
2
2
1

3

Topic
Administrativ
e
2
1
2

1
2
1
1
1

2

1
1

1
1

2
3
2

1
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Security Council Meeting Selected Topic Percentages, Session 2016

Spain

Total %
Africa
discussed
32%

Total %
MENA
discussed
35%

Senegal

33%

29%

17%

Russia
New
Zealand
Malaysia

22%

28%

22%

15%

38%

15%

36%

36%

7%

Japan

52%

26%

4%

France

38%

27%

12%

Egypt

32%

26%

16%

China

52%

30%

9%

Angola

38%

23%

12%

Venezuela

32%

32%

9%

Uruguay

53%

18%

0%

President's
Country

Total % international
security
9%

